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The “continuity of interest” doctrine has determined the
tax treatment of corporate mergers for over seventy years.
Under this doctrine, a corporate merger may qualify for taxdeferred treatment if an acquiror corporation pays
shareholders of the target corporation consideration that
consists of at least a minimum amount of the acquiror
corporation’s stock. The continuity of interest doctrine has
been criticized as unclear, inefficient, and unfair. Much of
this criticism, however, is obsolete and largely unpersuasive.
This Article offers a different justification for repealing the
doctrine: The end that the continuity of interest doctrine is
intended to achieve—an aggregate group of former target
corporation shareholders maintaining a “continuity of
interest” in the acquiror corporation following a merger—is
fiction. Because the doctrine serves a fictional premise, it
does not distinguish effectively between special mergers
deserving of tax-deferred treatment and ordinary sales that
should be taxed currently. The second half of this Article
presents a new proposal for replacing the continuity of
interest doctrine. Without any regard to the nature of the
consideration paid, the proposal delivers tax-deferred
treatment where the acquiror corporation continues the
historic business of the target corporation for at least two
years following the merger and where a target shareholder’s
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position within the enterprise does not change significantly as
a result of its exchange of target corporation stock for stock in
this acquiror corporation. While the continuity of interest
doctrine serves a fictitious premise, the proposal presented in
this Article restores some sense of truth to the policy of
reserving special tax treatment for mergers that represent
mere changes in form.

I.

INTRODUCTION

If Tevye from the Broadway classic Fiddler on the Roof1
were a tax lawyer instead of a milkman, he might stare
quizzically at the reorganization provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code (the “Code”) and describe them as overflowing
with peculiar traditions. Here, he might say, we have
traditions for everything—how to assume liabilities, how to
pay consideration, and even how to merge!2 Because of these
traditions, the tax law governing corporate mergers has kept
its balance for many, many years. One may ask, how did
these traditions get started? Understandably, Tevye might
answer, “I’ll tell you—I don’t know.”3
Of all these strange traditions, there is none as puzzling,
or as important, as the celebrated “continuity of interest”

* Associate, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. B.A., New York
University, 1999; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2002. I am grateful to Eran
Lempert for his encouragement and helpful comments during the drafting
of this Article. I also thank Brookes Billman, Peter Canellos, Noël
Cunningham, Victor Fleischer, Daniel Halperin, Joshua Holmes, Annie
Jeong, Roy Katzovicz, Garrett Moritz, Deborah Paul, Alex Raskolnikov,
Deborah Schenk, Bernard Wolfman, and Eric Zacks for their thoughtful
suggestions, ideas and criticism. Last, I dedicate this Article to my wife,
Jessica Blumenfeld, for enduring my countless drafts, and to our son,
Ariel, for providing us with the best form of continuity. The views
expressed herein are solely my own and should not be attributed to my
firm or its clients.
1
JERRY BOCK, FIDDLER ON THE ROOF (1964).
2
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 354, 357, 361, 368 (2005).
3
BOCK, supra note 1. Mercifully, refrains of “If I were a tax lawyer . .
.” have been omitted from this Article.
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doctrine.4 The tax law contains a significant exception from
the general requirement that taxpayers must recognize gains
and losses upon an exchange of property for something
“materially different” in the case of mergers that qualify as
“reorganizations.” These are special mergers that Congress
has described as “mere changes in form” and “purely paper
transactions” that do not merit current taxation.5 The courts
developed the continuity of interest doctrine as a way to
distinguish these special mergers from ordinary sales.6
Under the doctrine, the shareholders of the target
corporation (a “Target”) in a merger must receive a definite,
material, and substantial proprietary interest in the acquiror
corporation (an “Acquiror”) in exchange for their Target
stock in order for the merger to qualify as a reorganization.7
The doctrine has been refined to require that Target
shareholders, in the aggregate, must receive merger

4

The continuity of interest doctrine first emerged in 1932 in the
Second Circuit decision, Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d
937 (2d Cir. 1932). For excellent works providing general background on
the continuity of interest doctrine, see BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
¶ 12.21 (7th ed. 2004); MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, MERGERS,
ACQUISITIONS AND BUYOUTS ¶ 610 (2004 ed.) (providing dozens of helpful
examples that apply the continuity of interest doctrine); Jere D. McGaffey
& Kenneth C. Hunt, Continuity of Shareholder Interest in Acquisitive
Corporate Reorganizations, 59 TAXES 659 (1981); Michael L. Schulz, The
Evolution of the Continuity of Interest Test, General Utilities Repeal and
the Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions, 626 PLI/TAX 1165 (2004); Bernard
Wolfman, Continuity of Interest and the American Law Institute Study, 57
TAXES 840 (1979).
5
S. REP. NO. 65-617, pt. 1, at 5 (1918); H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 16
(1924).
6
See infra Part II for a discussion of these decisions. See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
7
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005); Helvering v. Minn.
Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935) (transaction qualified as reorganization
because Target shareholders acquired a “definite” and “substantial”
interest in the Acquiror).
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consideration that consists of at least forty percent Acquiror
stock.8
As the continuity of interest doctrine plays a pivotal role
in determining whether a corporate merger is tax-deferred or
taxable, it has been extolled as “the keystone of tax-free
reorganizations,”9 “the bedrock upon which reorganization
theory rests,”10 and “the glue that holds the reorganization
provisions together.”11
Despite this acclaim, the doctrine has also been subject to
an abundance of criticism over the years. It has been
described as “an arbitrary, complex, if not Byzantine”
doctrine,12 a doctrine reeking of “illogic,”13 and even a “sacred
cow.”14 Taxpayers have complained that the continuity of
interest doctrine is unclear, inefficient, and unfair.15 Critics
claim that, under the doctrine, any one of a number of
missteps before or after a merger could jeopardize its
intended tax treatment.

8

Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (as amended in 2006) (aggregate
merger consideration consisting of $40 worth of Acquiror stock and $60
cash satisfied continuity of interest requirement).
9
William J. Turnier, Continuity of Interest—Its Application to
Shareholders of the Acquiring Corporation, 64 CAL. L. REV. 902, 902
(1976).
10
William T. Hutton, Musings on Continuity of Interest—Recent
Developments, 56 TAXES 904, 904 (1979).
11
Daniel Q. Posin, Taxing Corporate Reorganizations: Purging
Penelope’s Web, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1371 (1985).
12
Wolfman, supra note 4, at 840.
13
Posin, supra note 11, at 1373.
14
Peter L. Faber, Continuity of Interest and Business Enterprise: Is It
Time to Bury Some Sacred Cows?, 34 TAX LAW 239, 239 (1981).
15
The amount of commentary that fits into this category is too great
to list even in a weighty footnote. For a representative sampling, see
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4, ¶ 12.21; Peter L. Faber,
Postreorganization Sales and Continuity of Interest, 68 TAX NOTES 863
(1995); Hutton, supra note 10; McGaffey & Hunt, supra note 4; David S.
Miller, The Devotion and Inevitable Extinction of the Continuity of Interest
Doctrine, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 187 (1996); Posin, supra note 11; Robert A. Rizzi,
Continuity of Interest and Reorganizations: Toward a Unified Theory, 17 J.
CORP. TAX’N 362 (1991); Turnier, supra note 9; Wolfman, supra note 4.
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Over the last ten years, the federal government, through
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury”) and
the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”), has steadily
chipped away at the continuity of interest doctrine in an
attempt to alleviate taxpayer concerns.
These
administrative agencies have repealed rules regarding,
among other items, the amount of time that Target
shareholders must retain Acquiror stock and whether an
Acquiror must pay merger consideration to “historic”
shareholders of the Target.16 Indeed, in September 2005, the
Treasury addressed the fact that the value of Acquiror stock
may fluctuate between the day on which a merger agreement
is signed and the day on which the merger actually occurs,
by issuing regulations that dramatically alter the manner in
which continuity of interest is measured.17
Although taxpayers have greeted these administrative
efforts with near-universal applause,18 this approach fails to
address fundamental questions. The discussion of the proper
role of the continuity of interest doctrine has reached a
critical fork in the road. The Treasury appears to have
chosen to continue refurbishing this antiquated judicial
concept into a set of rules with which taxpayers can learn to
live. The better route, however, is to confront the purpose
that the continuity of interest doctrine currently serves and
to question the role of the doctrine in delivering a special
exception from the realization rule.
This Article argues that the continuity of interest doctrine
fails to distinguish between mergers that represent mere
changes in form and those that should be considered
ordinary sales. More specifically, this Article asserts that
the continuity of interest doctrine does not achieve its
intended purpose—to identify mergers where an aggregate
group of former Target shareholders maintain a “continuity
of interest” in the Acquiror following the merger. Today,
corporate mergers may satisfy the continuity of interest

16
17
18

Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
Id. § 1.368-1(e)(2).
See, e.g., GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 4, ch. 6.
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requirement in form, but in substance, Target shareholders
may receive or retain little meaningful proprietary interest
in the Acquiror. The typical criticism of the doctrine has
ignored this fundamental defect.19 By highlighting the
fictional premise on which the continuity of interest doctrine
rests, this Article offers a different justification for repealing
the doctrine.
The second half of this Article offers a new alternative
proposal (the “Proposal”) for replacing the continuity of
interest doctrine. In the past, alternatives to the continuity
of interest doctrine, including the most prominent
alternative offered by the American Law Institute in 1980,20
have emphasized rejecting the continuity of interest doctrine
in favor of an explicitly elective regime. Those alternatives
have aimed to increase administrative convenience and
simplicity, but at the cost of devising rules that fail to serve
any other policy objective.
In contrast, the Proposal offered in this Article serves as
an effective alternative to the continuity of interest doctrine
in identifying special mergers that could be considered “mere
changes in form” and where Target shareholders experience
“purely paper transactions.”21
This Article argues that whether a merger should be
considered a mere change in form is highly dependent upon
whether an Acquiror continues a Target’s historic business
following a merger in a real and meaningful way. Under the
Proposal, at the corporate level, a merger will qualify for taxfavored treatment as a “qualifying merger” if a Target
merges into an Acquiror (transferring substantially all of its
assets to the Acquiror) and the Acquiror continues the
historic business of the Target for at least two years
following the merger. The Acquiror may conduct the historic
business of the Target directly or may utilize substantially

19

Part III infra describes the typical criticism of the continuity of
interest doctrine (and the shortcomings of this criticism) in detail.
20
A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C (1980).
21
S. REP. NO. 65-617, pt. 1, at 5 (1918); H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 16
(1924).
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all of the assets of the Target in a business of the Acquiror
that is of “like kind” to the Target’s historic business. There
is no requirement under the Proposal that the Acquiror pay
Target shareholders any specified amount of Acquiror stock,
cash, or any other type of property.
The Article also contends that, at the shareholder level,
changes in a Target shareholder’s particular circumstances
after a merger should be considered in determining whether
the shareholder has experienced a “purely paper
transaction.”
The Proposal provides that Target
shareholders will not be taxed upon the receipt of stock of an
Acquiror into which the Target has merged in a qualifying
merger. There are two exceptions to this shareholder nonrecognition rule.
First, to the extent that a Target
shareholder exchanges any voting stock for non-voting stock,
or vice versa, the exchange will be taxable. Second, if a
former Target shareholder experiences a disproportionate
reduction in his percentage interest (measured by either vote
or value) as a result of the merger, then the Target
shareholder’s exchange of any Target stock for Acquiror
stock will be taxable. There is no requirement under the
Proposal, however, that Target shareholders receive any
specified amount of Acquiror stock in order for the
shareholder non-recognition rule to apply.
Target
shareholders will be taxed, as under current law, on the
receipt of any cash or other non-stock property to the extent
of their realized gain.
The remainder of this Article is presented in five parts.
Part II offers a brief overview of the origin and rationale of
the reorganization provisions. Part III describes the typical
criticism of the continuity of interest doctrine, and why it
fails to offer compelling justification for repealing the
doctrine. Part IV offers a different argument for repealing
the doctrine by asserting that the doctrine fails to serve its
intended purpose. Part V offers a new alternative to the
continuity of interest doctrine by presenting the Proposal
described briefly above. Part VI is the conclusion.
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II. OVERVIEW AND RATIONALE OF THE
REORGANIZATION TRADITIONS
After the management teams of two corporations have
agreed to combine their businesses, their first task is to
choose a transaction structure for their combination.22 The
parties must decide whether the Acquiror should obtain the
stock or the assets of the Target. They must analyze, from a
number of perspectives, whether a merger of the Target into
the Acquiror, or into a subsidiary of the Acquiror, makes
more sense. One of the most important economic decisions
that they must make is whether the combination should be
structured as a currently taxable transaction or a taxdeferred reorganization.
In tax language, an acquisitive reorganization is a
transaction in which an Acquiror obtains control over the
stock or assets of a Target and the shareholders of the Target
receive stock of the Acquiror (or of an affiliate of the
Acquiror) in exchange for their Target stock.23 A transaction
that qualifies as a reorganization under the tax law can
result in especially favorable tax benefits to Target
shareholders and to the Target itself.24
22

For excellent discussions of the first steps that parties generally
take to effect a corporate merger or acquisition, see generally MARTIN
LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS (2002 ed.);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-ups in
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1990); Dennis J.
Block, Defensive Measures in Anticipation of and in Response to
Unsolicited Takeover Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 623 (1997).
23
The reorganization provisions of the Code are contained in I.R.C. §
368(a) (2005). The term “reorganization” has a different meaning in tax
language than it does in other contexts. To non-tax specialists, a
“reorganization” may refer solely to a bankruptcy restructuring. However,
in tax language, a reorganization is a much broader concept, referring to
mergers, consolidations, recapitalizations, divisions, asset or stock
acquisitions, and other corporate transactions.
24
Assuming, of course, that the parties do not desire to recognize
taxable losses currently. In a reorganization, a Target is not entitled to
recognize a loss currently if it exchanges property under a plan of
reorganization for stock, securities, or property of another corporation that
is a party to the reorganization.
I.R.C. § 361(a) (2005).
Target
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At the shareholder level, a Target shareholder does not
recognize gain or loss currently in a reorganization if it
receives solely Acquiror stock in exchange for its Target
stock.25 Rather, the gain or loss realized is deferred until the
Target shareholder disposes of the Acquiror stock received in
the reorganization. If the Target shareholder also receives
cash or other property (referred to as “boot”) from the
Acquiror, then the shareholder is required to recognize
taxable gain at the time of the transaction, but only to the
extent of the fair market value of the boot received.26
At the corporate level, the Target does not recognize gain
or loss on the transfer of its assets to the Acquiror or on the
receipt of Acquiror stock or other property that it
immediately distributes to its own shareholders.27
If a forward merger fails to qualify as a reorganization,
current taxation results at both the shareholder and
corporate levels.28

A. Overview of the Reorganization Traditions
With certain exceptions, acquisitive reorganizations are
subject to three overarching traditions, which are discussed
separately below: the continuity of interest, the continuity of
business enterprise, and the business purpose doctrines.

shareholders also will not be allowed to recognize a loss currently if they
exchange Target stock or securities for Acquiror stock or securities
pursuant to a plan of reorganization. I.R.C. § 354(a) (2005).
25
I.R.C. § 354(a) (2005).
26
Id. § 356(a).
27
Id. §§ 354(a)(1), 361(a).
28
A “forward” merger refers to a merger of a Target into the Acquiror
or a subsidiary of the Acquiror, with the Acquiror, or the subsidiary of the
Acquiror, surviving the merger. The double incidence of taxation results
from the classical model of the U.S. corporate tax system. In this model,
corporations and their shareholders are treated as separate persons
(unless an election to disregard the separate existence of the corporation is
available and exercised).
Consequently, in a failed corporate
reorganization, both the Target and its shareholders are subject to current
taxation.
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1. The Continuity of Interest Doctrine
The continuity of interest doctrine is the key determinant
of a merger’s qualification as a reorganization. The doctrine
provides that Target shareholders must receive a definite,
material, and substantial proprietary interest in the
Acquiror in exchange for their Target shares in order for a
merger to qualify as a reorganization.29 In determining
whether an Acquiror delivers this type of interest to the
Target shareholders, the continuity of interest doctrine
considers the aggregate amount of Acquiror stock that the
Target shareholders receive in a reorganization.30 Only
Acquiror stock is respected as a sufficient continuing
proprietary interest in the Acquiror.31
Under the continuity of interest doctrine, as currently
applied by the Treasury and the IRS, an Acquiror in a
merger that qualifies as a reorganization must pay Target
shareholders aggregate merger consideration consisting of at
least 40 percent Acquiror stock.32 For example, if an
Acquiror delivers merger consideration to Target
shareholders consisting, in the aggregate, of $60 cash and
forty Acquiror shares that are worth $1 each, this merger
consideration satisfies the continuity of interest doctrine
because it consists of forty percent Acquiror stock.
The continuity of interest doctrine is a purely judicial
creation.33 The decisions that formed the doctrine can be
distilled into four distinct categories. First, the courts held
that in a merger qualifying as a reorganization, an Acquiror
29

Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
31
See, e.g., LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Pinellas Ice &
Cold Storage Co. v. Comm’r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
32
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (as amended in 2005).
33
See Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935); John A. Nelson
Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Comm’r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm’r, 60 F.2d
937 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). See Erwin N.
Griswold, Securities and Continuity of Interest, 58 HARV. L. REV. 705
(1945) for a thorough discussion of the early judicial decisions leading to
the continuity of interest doctrine.
30
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must pay Target shareholders Acquiror stock in order to
provide these shareholders with a “definite” continuing
interest in the affairs of the Acquiror (the “What”
decisions).34 Second, the courts dramatically expanded the
doctrine by defining how much of the aggregate merger
consideration must consist of Acquiror stock (courts blessed
amounts ranging from 38.5 percent to 56 percent) (the “How
Much” decisions).35 Third, the courts held that the Acquiror
stock must be delivered not to just any Target shareholders,
but to historic Target shareholders (the “Who” decisions).36
Fourth, the courts established that post-reorganization sales
of Acquiror stock by former Target shareholders could violate

34
In Pinellas, the Supreme Court articulated the continuity of
interest doctrine by providing that Target shareholders must acquire a
“definite” interest in the affairs of the Acquiror. As a result of Pinellas and
several other “What” decisions, the continuity of interest doctrine held
that only Acquiror stock would represent such a definite interest in the
Acquiror. See also Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm’r, 60 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933) (“[T]he primary requisite [of a
reorganization] is that there must be some continuity of interest on the
part of the transferor corporation or its stock holders.”).
35
The Supreme Court significantly broadened the continuity of
interest requirement in Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378
(1935), by establishing that Acquiror stock must represent a “substantial”
and “material” part of the aggregate consideration paid by an Acquiror to a
Target or its shareholders. On the same day that it decided Minnesota
Tea, the Supreme Court also held in John A. Nelson v. Helvering, 296 U.S.
374 (1935), that Acquiror non-voting preferred stock (which comprised
38.5 percent of the aggregate consideration delivered to Target
shareholders) represented a “definite and substantial interest in the
affairs of the [Acquiror] corporation,” and thus, satisfied the continuity of
interest requirement.
36
See, e.g., Yoc Heating Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 168 (1973), in
which the Tax Court held that a transaction did not qualify as a
reorganization if a sufficient quantum of Acquiror stock was not paid to
“historic” shareholders of the Target, and J.E. Seagram Corp. v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 75 (1995), where the Tax Court held that only
Target stock that was purchased by the Acquiror itself prior to a
reorganization (as was the case in Yoc Heating Corp.) counted against the
historic continuity of interest requirement.
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the continuity of interest requirement (the “How Long”
decisions).37
In recent years, the Treasury and the IRS have issued a
significant amount of taxpayer-friendly guidance in response
to taxpayer concerns that the continuity of interest doctrine
was wreaking havoc in modern business transactions.
For example, in 1998, the U.S. Treasury instituted a
monumental change in the application of the continuity of
interest doctrine when it issued rules providing that Target
shareholders’ sales of Target stock prior to a reorganization
and sales of Acquiror stock after a reorganization, in each
case to parties unrelated to the Acquiror, are disregarded for
continuity of interest purposes.38 These rules obviated the
“Who” decisions and the “How Long” decisions.
In addition, as recently as September 2005, the Treasury
clarified the minimum threshold contemplated by the “How
Much” decisions by establishing a clear forty percent
guideline for taxpayers to use in determining whether the
Acquiror stock to be paid to Target shareholders in a merger
would represent a “substantial” amount of the total merger
consideration.39 In those regulations, the Treasury also
acknowledged that the value of Acquiror stock may fluctuate
between the day on which a merger agreement is signed and
the day on which the merger is closed by permitting
taxpayers to use signing date values of Acquiror stock in

37

The courts addressed this question in two judicial decisions that
involved similar facts, Heintz v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 132 (1955), and
McDonald’s Restaurants of Illinois v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.
1982). In Heintz, Target shareholders (who wanted cash for their Target
shares) received Acquiror stock on the condition that the Acquiror help
those shareholders dispose of the stock after the merger. In McDonald’s,
the Target shareholders sold Acquiror stock received in a merger
immediately after the merger and pursuant to a prearranged plan. In
each of these cases, the Target shareholders sold their Acquiror stock for
cash to third parties unrelated to the Acquiror. The court in each case
held that the post-reorganization sales violated the continuity of interest
requirement.
38
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
39
See id. § 1.368-1(e)(2).
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certain instances to perform the continuity of interest
calculation.40

2. The Continuity of Business Enterprise
Doctrine
An acquisitive reorganization must also satisfy the
continuity of business enterprise requirement.41 An Acquiror
must continue the Target’s historic business following a
reorganization, or it must use a significant portion of the
Target’s business assets in its own business.42 In contrast to
the continuity of interest requirement, however, the
continuity of business enterprise requirement under current
law has not been viewed as particularly onerous to
taxpayers.43

3. The Business Purpose Doctrine
Last, each reorganization must be motivated by a
legitimate business purpose.44 In the acquisitive (as opposed
to the divisive) reorganization context, the business purpose
requirement is also easy to satisfy.45 The mere fact that a
Target would agree to combine with an unrelated Acquiror

40

Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2006) (“Continuity of
business enterprise (COBE) requires that the issuing corporation (P) . . .
either continue the target corporation’s (T’s) historic business or use a
significant portion of T’s historic business assets in a business.”).
42
Id.
43
CHERYL D. BLOCK, CORPORATE TAXATION 347 (2d ed. 2002).
44
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (stating that the
transaction “was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance
masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else . . . .”); see
Arthur M. Michaelson, “Business Purpose” and Tax-Free Reorganization,
61 YALE L.J. 14 (1952) (providing an overview of the business purpose
doctrine in the context of acquisitive reorganizations); Harvey M. Spear,
‘Corporate Business Purpose’ in Reorganization, 3 TAX L. REV. 225 (1947).
45
See Louis S. Freeman, General Overview and Strategies in
Representing Sellers, 618 PLI/Tax 7 (2004) (observing that “the business
purpose requirement as applied to acquisitive reorganizations is
substantially less stringent than the requirement as applied to spinoffs”).
41
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implies that the Target’s management believes that the
combination will yield valuable synergies, that the Acquiror
will provide new strategic direction to the business of the
former Target or that the Target is simply in need of capital
to run its business.46

B. Specific Forms of Acquisitive Reorganizations
An acquisitive reorganization must also meet the specific
statutory requirements of one of the reorganization
provisions of the Code.
Several of these forms of
reorganization contain more stringent requirements than the
general traditions described above. Specifically, the judicial
continuity of interest doctrine is only relevant in the case of
statutory mergers and forward triangular mergers.47
Consequently, those two reorganization forms are the focus
of this Article.48

1. Statutory Merger
A statutory merger of the Target directly into the
Acquiror, in which Target shareholders receive stock of the
Acquiror, qualifies as a reorganization.49 In this transaction,
the Acquiror is the surviving corporate entity after the

46

If, on the other hand, the transaction appears to be motivated in
significant part by a desire to avoid federal income taxes, then a careful
analysis of all the purposes motivating the reorganization is necessary. As
Judge Hand famously wrote in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d
Cir. 1934), “the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the
separate words, as a melody is more than the notes.”
47
The other acquisitive forms of reorganization contain specific
statutory provisions that dictate the contents of the consideration to be
paid by the Acquiror. See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C) and (a)(2)(E) (2005).
48
This article, thus, does not address statutory requirements
regarding the amounts of Acquiror stock that must be paid to Target
shareholders in other types of reorganizations, such as reorganizations
under I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C) or (a)(2)(E) (2005).
49
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005).
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merger.50 There are no restrictions here as to the type of
consideration paid to the Target shareholders as long as the
judicial continuity of interest requirement described above is
satisfied.51 The statutory merger generally has been viewed
as the least restrictive of the specific reorganization forms.52

2. Forward Triangular Merger
In a forward triangular merger, the Target merges into a
corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror (rather than into the
Acquiror itself), and the Target shareholders receive stock of
the Acquiror.53 The surviving corporate entity in this merger
is the corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror. This transaction
will qualify as a reorganization if the corporate subsidiary of
the Acquiror acquires “substantially all” of the Target’s
assets,54 Target shareholders do not receive any stock of the
corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror,55 and, again, the
judicial continuity of interest doctrine described above is
satisfied.

50
See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2006) for specific
requirements of a statutory merger or consolidation under I.R.C. §
368(a)(1)(A) (2005).
51
Other specific forms of acquisitive reorganizations, by contrast,
require that only voting stock may be paid to Target shareholders. See
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2005).
52
See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4, ¶ 12.22 (citing statutory
mergers under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005) as “the oldest of, and the
prototype for, the various reorganization forms”); Thomas P. Fitzgerald et
al., Corporate Mergers, Acquisitions and Reorganizations, 626 PLI/TAX 707
(2004).
53
I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (2005). The key advantage to this transaction
structure, as opposed to a statutory merger, is that the Target’s liabilities
become those of the corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror rather than of the
Acquiror itself.
54
The IRS views at least 90 percent of the Target’s net assets and 70
percent of the Target’s gross assets as substantial. Rev. Proc. 86-42, 19862 C.B. 722 amplifying Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
55
I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D)(i) (2005).
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C. Rationale of the Reorganization Traditions
The primary explanation for Congress’s enactment of the
reorganization provisions is that Congress believed that
certain mergers constituted “purely paper transactions” and
“mere changes in form”56 that should not be subject to
current taxation.57
The reorganization provisions thus
represent Congress’s express desire to exempt certain types
of mergers and other transactions from the realization rule
of our tax system.58 According to the drafters of the
reorganization provisions, it would not be appropriate to tax
Target shareholders on their stock-for-stock exchanges in
these types of transactions because they did not cash out
their original investment, and thus, they did not experience
In the eyes of the drafters, a
a realization event.59

56

In 1918, the Senate Finance Committee commented that the
nonrecognition principle under the reorganization provisions was intended
to “negative the assertion of tax in the case of certain purely paper
transactions.” S. REP. NO. 65-617, pt. 1, at 5 (1918). See also H.R. REP.
NO. 68-179 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 17-18 (1924) (commenting that
the reorganization provisions are “mere changes in form and not in
substance, and consequently should not be considered as affecting a
realization of income at the time of the exchange”).
57
The development of the modern reorganization provisions of the
Code can be traced to the period immediately following World War I and
stretching until 1934.
Congress enacted the first reorganization
provisions in the Revenue Act of 1918, which provided that no taxable gain
or loss would occur with respect to stock or securities received by a Target
shareholder “in connection with the reorganization, merger or
consolidation of a corporation.” Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40
Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919). See Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes and
Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2000), for a thorough discussion of
the history of the reorganization provisions.
58
For a positive description of the realization rule, see Deborah H.
Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REV. 355
(2004).
59
See H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, pt. 1, at 16 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, pt.
1, at 17-18 (1924) (commenting that reorganizations represent mere
“changes in form not substance”). The tax law requires that a “material”
modification to a taxpayer’s investment must occur in order for gain
realized to give rise to income. See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S.
554 (1991) (exchange of property triggers realization event when
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realization event could only occur when the former Target
shareholders disposed of their Acquiror stock received in a
reorganization in exchange for “materially” different
property, such as cash.60
Commentators have argued that the reorganization
provisions serve a number of other policy objectives, such as
subsidizing corporate combinations61 and relieving taxpayers
of liquidity62 and valuation63 hardships that could result from
the taxation of stock-for-stock exchanges that occur pursuant
to certain mergers. This Article makes no attempt to probe
the normative justifications for the reorganization
provisions.
Rather, this Article considers whether the
continuity of interest doctrine effectively identifies mergers
that could be characterized as “mere changes in form” and

exchanged properties are “materially different”); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a)
(1996).
60
See A.W. Gregg, Treasury Expert Explains Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 1924, at 1. Gregg, a Treasury official in the 1920s, noted that
Congress did not intend the reorganization provisions to apply to ordinary
sales.
61
Senator Watson, one of the original drafters of the reorganization
provisions, stated that “at a time when so much reorganization is going on
in the business world, it is thought by all those interested in the
upbuilding of the industries of the country at this time that this is a very
helpful provision.” 61 CONG. REC. 6563 (1921). See Jerome R. Hellerstein,
Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARV. L. REV. 254, 276 (1957) (describing
efficiency as one of the principal rationales of the reorganization
provisions). The author criticized this rationale, however, by commenting
that “Congress has not seriously considered the wisdom of granting nonrecognition to reorganization exchanges.” Id. at 276 n.22.
62
See ROBERT S. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS: THEIR
FEDERAL TAX STATUS 68 (1948) (“If an exchange is deemed taxable and yet
the taxpayer has received nothing that is more than a paper profit, where
is he going to get the money to pay the tax?”).
63
See Bank, supra note 57 (“Adams rationalized the existence of the
reorganization provision on the ground that ‘it is difficult to make
appraisals. In the average reorganization, or in many reorganizations,
there is no definite, fixed market price for the securities.’”) (quoting An Act
to Reduce and Equalize Taxation, to Amend and Simplify the Revenue Act
of 1918, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 8245 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., 67th Cong. 29 (1921) (statement of Prof. T.S. Adams)).
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“purely paper transactions,” the types of mergers upon which
Congress intended to bestow special tax treatment.

III. TYPICAL CRITICISM OF THE CONTINUITY OF
INTEREST DOCTRINE
Taking shots at the continuity of interest doctrine is a
tradition among tax scholars and practitioners that is almost
as old as the doctrine itself. Not surprisingly, the criticism
has tended to fall into some familiar categories. Three of the
most common charges levied against the doctrine are that it
contains unclear requirements, provokes transactional
inefficiency, and results in unfair outcomes.64 Despite the
repeated articulation of these claims, they are not compelling
justifications for repealing the doctrine. None of them
addresses the more fundamental question of whether the
continuity of interest doctrine is an appropriate means of
distinguishing between a merger that is a mere change in
form and one that is an ordinary sale. This Part briefly
describes the typical criticisms and their shortcomings.

A. Lack of Clarity
A common criticism of the continuity of interest doctrine
is that its requirements are unclear. The doctrine requires
that an Acquiror must pay a “substantial” amount of
Acquiror stock to Target shareholders in order for a merger
to qualify as a reorganization.65 But how much Acquiror
stock is enough? Acquiror stock thresholds ranging from 56
percent66 to 50 percent67 to 38.5 percent68 of aggregate merger
consideration have all been cited with approval by the courts
and the IRS as providing a sufficient continuing interest to
64

See, e.g., Faber, supra note 14; Hutton, supra note 10; Miller, supra
note 15; Posin, supra note 11; Wolfman, supra note 4.
65
Helvering v. Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (holding that Acquiror
stock must consist of “a substantial part of the value of the thing
transferred”).
66
Id.
67
Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568.
68
John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1935).
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Target shareholders.
Because the required minimum
threshold is not definite, so the argument goes, parties to a
merger lack certainty that their merger consideration
consists of the proper amount of Acquiror stock.69 Without
clear rules, the parties risk stumbling into a fully taxable
transaction. This lack of certainty has been criticized as
tending “to interfere with transactions at the fringes and
otherwise to contribute to the heartburn of tax lawyers.”70
Although the lack of clarity argument is frequently
offered, it does not support the outright repeal of the
doctrine. If proponents of this argument find ambiguity
regarding the minimum required percentage of Acquiror
stock troubling, then they should argue in favor of more
definitive guidelines. Judges, not Congress, created the
continuity of interest doctrine, and so it is understandable
that the minimum required amount of Acquiror stock has
varied from case to case. Indeed, over the past few years, the
Treasury and the IRS have made a serious effort to set a
clear minimum threshold amount. In September 2005, the
Treasury issued final regulations that state that merger
consideration consisting of forty percent Acquiror stock will
satisfy the continuity of interest requirement.71 The new
bright line requirement thus puts an end to the inquiry
regarding how much Acquiror stock is enough. The more
important question is whether the payment of any Acquiror
stock to Target shareholders is an indication that a Target
has undergone a mere change in form.

B. Transactional Inefficiency
A related criticism of the doctrine is that it results in an
unreasonable
amount
of
transactional
inefficiency.
Proponents of this criticism typically argue that lawyers for
parties entering into merger agreements devote too much
time to negotiating the means by which the continuity of
69
See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4; GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note
4, ¶ 610.
70
Miller, supra note 15.
71
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (as amended in 2005).
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interest requirement will be satisfied instead of more
important business issues.72
For example, in most public company mergers, the
merger agreement conditions the closing of the merger on
the receipt by each of the Acquiror and the Target of a
written opinion of counsel that the transaction will qualify as
a reorganization.73 If the lawyers for each party to the
merger have different views on the proper amount of
Acquiror stock that must be paid to Target shareholders to
satisfy the continuity of interest requirement, then the
parties could find themselves at a standstill.74
Also, in the past, transactional inefficiency resulted
because continuity of interest was tested using the value of
Acquiror stock on the day on which a merger actually
occurred, rather than on the day on which the merger
agreement was signed.75 Parties would expend valuable time
negotiating extremely complex “tax treatment preservation”

72

See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Reorganization Tax Opinions, 452
PLI/TAX 897 (1999) (“Does it matter how close to ‘the edge’ (be it 40
percent or 50 percent) of continuity you are? Yes, as difficult questions
can be avoided if the relevant line could not be crossed under any
circumstances.”).
73
See Edward D. Herlihy et al., Financial Institutions Mergers and
Acquisitions 2001: Adapting to the Challenges of a Changing Landscape,
1299 PLI/CORP 11 (2002) (“[I]n part-stock/part-cash transactions intended
to qualify as tax-free reorganizations, customary closing conditions that
each party receive a tax opinion from its respective counsel may . . . give
each party a right to walk away from the deal if the buyer’s stock price
declines significantly enough to threaten meeting the ‘continuity of
interest’ requirement . . . (i.e., that stock represent at least 40 to 45
percent of merger consideration value at closing)”).
74
See id.
75
See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on Continuity of
Interest and Pre-Closing Stock Value Fluctuation, 102 TAX NOTES 596
(2004), for a thorough description of this problem. See also LIPTON &
STEINBERGER, supra note 22, §10.02; Deborah L. Paul, IRS to Ease
Continuity Requirements for Part-Cash/Part-Stock Deals, 8 No. 5 M & A
LAW. 11, 11 (2004) (stating that the “current practice of measuring
continuity of proprietary interest at closing is awkward”); Adam Sohn, ASigning Continuity of Interest (2004) (unpublished article, on file with
author).
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provisions designed to ensure that the continuity of interest
requirement would be satisfied even if the value of the
Acquiror’s stock dropped between the signing and closing
dates.76
The argument that the continuity of interest doctrine
results in transactional inefficiency is largely obsolete. First,
the Treasury’s new bright line forty percent Acquiror stock
threshold
should
reduce
transactional
inefficiency.
Differences of opinion between counsel over the appropriate
amount of Acquiror stock that must be paid to Target
shareholders should disappear. Second, in September 2005,
the Treasury issued final regulations that address the
fluctuation issue.77 These regulations appear to alleviate the
fluctuation concern and the need for complicated tax
treatment preservation provisions in most merger
agreements.
Further, even if the continuity of interest doctrine
resulted in transactional inefficiency, that consequence alone
should not merit the doctrine’s repeal.
Taxpayers in
reorganizations receive a very special benefit—neither the
Target nor the Target shareholders are subject to the
realization rule that would require them to pay current tax.
In light of this benefit, it is understandable that they are
forced to satisfy a requirement intended to distinguish a
special merger from an ordinary sale, even if their effort
results in incidental transactional inefficiency.

C. Unfair Outcomes
Vocal opponents of the continuity of interest doctrine
have long argued for its repeal as a result of the unfair

76

See Paul, supra note 75, at 11 (“Many merger agreements contain a
provision that increases the amount of stock consideration and decreases
the amount of cash consideration if an adjustment is required in order to
satisfy the continuity requirement and obtain the tax opinion. In some
cases, those price adjustments are heavily negotiated. In all cases, as a
business matter, the parties would just as well do without such price
adjustments.”).
77
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) (as amended in 2005).
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outcomes that they contend it produces, particularly with
respect to minority Target shareholders.78 The continuity of
interest doctrine may cause a minority Target shareholder
that exchanges her Target stock solely for Acquiror stock to
suffer current taxation in the event that too many of her
fellow Target shareholders receive cash in exchange for their
Target shares.
The Tax Court considered these facts in Kass v.
Commissioner.79 In that case, the Tax Court held that Mrs.
Kass, a minority shareholder who elected to receive solely
Acquiror stock in a merger, engaged in a taxable exchange
because the consideration paid in the aggregate to Target
shareholders failed to satisfy the continuity of interest
requirement.80
Critics argue that it is inequitable to tax minority
shareholders, like Mrs. Kass, who desire to continue their
proprietary interest following a merger simply because of the
actions of their fellow shareholders.81 They contend that the
continuity
of
interest
doctrine
requires
minority
shareholders to obtain sophisticated tax advice in order to
understand the tax consequences of exchanging shares or
receiving cash.82 Consequently, the continuity of interest
doctrine has the potential to penalize minority shareholders.
The treatment of minority shareholders, however, is not a
sufficient justification for repeal of the continuity of interest
doctrine. The purpose of the continuity of interest doctrine is
to classify a merger as a mere change in form because a
significant number of former Target shareholders continue to
own an interest in the Acquiror after the merger. If we
assume that the premise of the doctrine is valid (although
this premise is questioned below), then Mrs. Kass should
have suffered current taxation because her merger did not
result in continued ownership by a significant number of

78
79
80
81
82

See, e.g., Wolfman, supra note 4; Posin, supra note 11.
60 T.C. 218 (1973).
Id.
See Wolfman, supra note 4.
See id.
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former Target shareholders, and consequently, was not a
mere change in form of the Target. Whether the Target
underwent a mere change in form, rather than Mrs. Kass’s
position as a minority or majority shareholder, should
determine whether her stock-for-stock exchange is taxable.
It is also inappropriate to repeal the continuity of interest
doctrine for the purpose of equalizing treatment between
majority and minority shareholders. Minority shareholders
assume the risk of a variety of adverse consequences (both
tax- and non-tax-related) by virtue of holding their shares in
the minority.83 For example, a corporation’s decision to
merge with another entity or to amend its charter are
decisions that may directly impact minority shareholders’
interests, but are beyond the control of these shareholders as
a result of their minority position. The imposition of adverse
tax consequences on minority shareholders due to the actions
of other shareholders is no different. The corporate law, not
the tax law, should bear the responsibility for protecting the
rights of minority shareholders.

IV. CONTINUITY OF INTEREST: A TRADITION OF
FICTION
The typical criticism of the continuity of interest doctrine
is unpersuasive, in large part, because it fails to ask deeper
questions about the doctrine. The basic premise of the
continuity of interest doctrine is that continued ownership by
a significant proportion of former Target shareholders in an
Acquiror following a merger is the key indicator that a
Target has undergone merely a change in form.84 Effectively,
the doctrine judges whether a thing has changed by looking
to its owners rather than to the thing itself. This premise is
questionable.
The shareholders of a corporation have a myriad of
unique characteristics and intentions. In many corporations,
83

See generally, Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close
Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV.
749 (2000).
84
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4, ¶ 12.21.
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there is no indication that shareholders think, speak, or act
with any degree of coordination. Yet, the continuity of
interest doctrine implies that a Target’s identity is
inextricably linked to its historic shareholder base.
Moreover, if a certain proportion of those shareholders fail to
continue to hold an ownership interest in the repackaged
Target following a merger, then the doctrine considers the
Target to have undergone something more than a mere
change in form.
But even if we accept this premise—that continued
historic shareholder ownership is critical to the merechange-in-form inquiry—there is an even more basic
question to be addressed. Does the continuity of interest
doctrine work?
This Part argues that the continuity of interest doctrine
should be repealed because it fails to serve its intended
purpose. In many mergers that qualify as reorganizations,
the concept of a minimum quantum of proprietary interests
in the Target continuing as proprietary interests in the
Acquiror is fiction. Because the doctrine does not identify
effectively those mergers where Target shareholders actually
continue their proprietary interests following a merger, it
certainly cannot distinguish between a merger that is a mere
change in form and one that is an ordinary sale.

A. Something Completely Different
One might think that when Target shareholders
“continue” their proprietary interests following a merger that
is a mere change in form, they hold stock in an Acquiror that
conducts either the business of the former Target or at least
a similar business.85 Why then, one might ask, would Target

85

Such an assumption would seem particularly plausible given the
requirements of other non-recognition provisions of the Code. For
example, I.R.C. § 1031 (2005) offers non-recognition treatment to
taxpayers when property held for productive use in a trade or business or
for investment is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to be held
either for productive use in a trade or business or for investment.
However, the property to be exchanged must be of “like kind” in nature
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shareholders be deemed to have continued an interest in the
Target by holding stock in the Acquiror?86
Despite this intuition, current law does not contain a
meaningful requirement that Target shareholders own stock,
following a merger, in an Acquiror that conducts the
business of the Target or even a business similar to the
Target’s, in order to satisfy the continuity of interest
doctrine.87 In fact, Target shareholders may exchange their
stock in a Target that conducts one business for stock in an
Acquiror that conducts, in the immortal words of Monty
Python, “something completely different.”88
The tax law contains rules requiring an Acquiror in a
reorganization to “continue” the business enterprise of a
Target following a merger that qualifies as a reorganization.
These rules, however, have frequently been criticized as
“rather loose and reasonably easy to satisfy.”89 The key part
of a corporation’s identity, its business activities, can be
unrecognizably transformed as a result of a merger that
qualifies as a reorganization without breaching these rules.
In these types of mergers, it is difficult to argue that
Target shareholders, no matter how many receive stock in
the Acquiror, continue their proprietary interests—at least,
in the same way as before the merger—at all. Consider the
following relatively simple hypothetical.
For the past forty years, Farmer Brown has operated a
local dairy business in Delaware through his wholly owned
and character. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) (as amended in 2002). As the
following discussion illustrates, the continuity of interest doctrine and the
reorganization provisions contain no such “like kind” requirement.
86
Indeed, the plain English definition of the word “continuity” is
“uninterrupted duration or continuation especially without essential
change.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2005).
87
The relevant regulations require that an Acquiror “continue” the
business of the Target. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(i) (as amended in 2005).
There is no requirement (bright line or implied) that the Acquiror continue
the business of the Target for a set amount of time.
88
My sincere apologies to Monty Python for subjecting it to the world
of corporate tax.
See MONTY PYTHON, AND NOW FOR SOMETHING
COMPLETELY DIFFERENT (1971).
89
BLOCK, supra note 43.
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corporation, Small Cheesecorp. The heart of his business
activity has been delivering cheese products to the local
residents and businesses of his county. One day, Farmer
Brown receives an unsolicited takeover offer from Acme
Purse Company, a large producer of women’s leather
products.
Acme Purse Company is very interested in
acquiring Farmer Brown’s valuable cattle supply and using
it, not for cheese, but for leather purse production. The
acquisition will be structured as a reorganization in which
Acme Purse Company will pay Farmer Brown merger
consideration consisting entirely of Acme Purse Company
stock in exchange for his Small Cheesecorp stock, and Small
Cheesecorp will be merged into Acme Purse Company.90
Farmer Brown accepts Acme Purse Company’s offer and the
transaction closes. Because Farmer Brown exchanges his
Small Cheesecorp stock for merger consideration consisting
solely of Acme Purse Company stock, the continuity of
interest requirement is easily satisfied.91
Even though Farmer Brown owns stock in a very
different corporation following the merger than he did before
the merger, Farmer Brown is deemed to have “continued” his
proprietary interest. Before the merger, Small Cheesecorp
was the embodiment of Farmer Brown’s personal business
skills and interests—cheese production. After the merger of
Small Cheesecorp into Acme Purse Company, Farmer
Brown’s proprietary interest relates to a business in which
he has little knowledge or interest—women’s leather purse
production. The continuity of business enterprise rules
under current law enable the merger to qualify as a
reorganization as long as Acme Purse Company uses
substantially all of Small Cheesecorp’s assets in “a”
business.92 Because the rules do not require Acme Purse
Company’s business to be similar to Small Cheesecorp’s
business, the corporate identity of Small Cheesecorp

90
The Acme Purse Company/Small Cheesecorp merger is intended to
qualify as a reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005).
91
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
92
Id. § 1.368-1(d)(i).
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disappears in the merger. Farmer Brown, nonetheless, is
treated as “continuing” his proprietary interest as though
nothing more than a mere change in form has occurred. This
characterization is fiction.
The continuity of interest and continuity of business
enterprise rules under current law are linked.
Commentators have criticized the lax nature of the
continuity of business enterprise requirement, but they do
not identify the link between those rules and the continuity
of interest requirement.93 One of the reasons that the
continuity of interest requirement serves a fictional premise
is that there is no clear rule that the Acquiror must preserve
the corporate identity of the Target (its historic business)
following a merger in a real and meaningful way. Without
such a requirement, Target shareholders like Farmer Brown
are depicted as continuing their proprietary interests
irrespective of the material change that those interests may
have undergone.

B. Disproportionate Changes in Proportionate Interest
The continuity of interest doctrine does not require a
Target shareholder to continue to own a proportionate
interest in the Acquiror after a merger that is similar to the
proportionate interest that it owned in the Target prior to
the merger.94 Just as the size of an Acquiror relative to that
of a Target is irrelevant for continuity of interest purposes,95
so too is the comparison of the Target shareholder’s
proportionate interest in the Target with the proportionate
93

See BLOCK, supra note 43.
The relevant Treasury regulations state that “[a] proprietary
interest in the target corporation is preserved if, in a potential
reorganization, it is exchanged for a proprietary interest in the issuing
corporation . . . , it is exchanged by the acquiring corporation for a direct
interest in the target corporation enterprise, or it otherwise continues as a
proprietary interest in the target corporation.” Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as
amended in 2005).
95
Whether measured in terms of the Acquiror’s market capitalization,
net asset value, or revenue, in the world of continuity of interest, size does
not matter.
94
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interest that the Target shareholder will hold in the
Acquiror.96 Consequently, a Target shareholder holding
stock representing a large proportionate interest (whether in
terms of voting power or value) in the Target can exchange
his Target stock for Acquiror stock that represents a
relatively insignificant proportionate interest in the Acquiror
without violating the continuity of interest requirement.
To appreciate this surprising allowance, consider the
following variation on the previous example: There are 1,000
shares of Small Cheesecorp stock outstanding, and Farmer
Brown owns all 1,000 shares. Farmer Brown thus owns one
hundred percent of the stock of Small Cheesecorp. Big
Cheesecorp, the largest producer and distributor of cheese in
the Eastern United States, offers to acquire Small
Cheesecorp.
The transaction will be structured as a
reorganization in which Big Cheesecorp will pay Farmer
Brown 1,000 shares of Big Cheesecorp stock (worth $100,000
in the aggregate) in exchange for Farmer Brown’s stock in
Small Cheesecorp, and Small Cheesecorp will be merged into
Big Cheesecorp.97 There are approximately 100,000,000
shares of Big Cheesecorp stock outstanding and traded on
the New York Stock Exchange. Farmer Brown accepts Big
Cheesecorp’s proposal.
Again, because Farmer Brown
exchanges his Small Cheesecorp stock for merger
consideration consisting solely of Big Cheesecorp stock, the
continuity of interest requirement is satisfied.98
In this transaction, Farmer Brown’s proportionate
interest has changed dramatically. Whereas Farmer Brown
owned 100 percent of Small Cheesecorp before the merger,
Farmer Brown now owns a mere .001 percent of Big
Cheesecorp after the merger.99 Table 1 below illustrates the
96

See also Posin, supra note 11 (observing that there is no
requirement regarding relative size in the continuity of interest
regulations).
97
The Big Cheesecorp/Small Cheesecorp merger is intended to qualify
as a reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005).
98
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
99
As a result of the merger, Farmer Brown’s proportionate interest
has plummeted 99.999 percent.
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change in Farmer Brown’s proportionate interest following
the merger:
Table 1. Farmer Brown’s Relative Proportionate Interests in
Small Cheesecorp and Big Cheesecorp

Shares Owned by Farmer
Brown
Total Shares Outstanding
Farmer Brown’s
Proportionate Interest

Small Cheesecorp
(Before Merger)

Big Cheesecorp
(After Merger)

1,000
1,000

1,000
100,000,000

100%

.001%

Prior to the merger, Farmer Brown was completely in
control of the corporate actions of Small Cheesecorp. He
decided who would run his cheesemaking equipment and
maybe even how long his cheese would hang or at what
temperature it would be prepared. However, after the
merger, Farmer Brown is just another minority shareholder,
owning an interest representing one thousandth of a percent
of Big Cheesecorp. He cannot direct the corporate actions of
the company; instead his role is relegated to attending
shareholder meetings and occasionally voting for directors of
the company in annual shareholder elections. His voting
power, though, represents only 1,000 out of 100,000,000
votes.100
Once again, Farmer Brown has exchanged his proprietary
interest in Small Cheesecorp for stock in something
completely different. As a result of the merger, Farmer
Brown has experienced a very significant change in his role
as a shareholder, as he has been transformed from a sole
shareholder who controlled nearly all corporate decisions to
one who has an almost infinitesimal role in corporate
100
It is likely that, given Farmer Brown’s relatively minuscule
influence over the corporate affairs of Big Cheesecorp, Farmer Brown may
not even participate in routine shareholder meetings. See Arthur D.
Spratlin, Jr., Modern Remedies for Oppression in the Closely Held
Corporation, 60 MISS. L.J. 405, 405 (1990) (discussing rights of minority
shareholders in a publicly held corporation).
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decisionmaking. Yet, the continuity of interest doctrine
holds that Farmer Brown has continued his interest,
experiencing a mere “readjustment” of his investment.
Other commentators have noted that the treatment of a
merger of a small private company into a large public
company as a reorganization represents a weakness in the
continuity of interest doctrine. However, their analysis
tends to focus on the “marketable” nature of the stock in a
publicly traded Acquiror that Target shareholders receive.101
Because the Acquiror stock received in these mergers is
marketable, Target shareholders can quickly dispose of it for
cash.102 Commentators contend that the liquid nature of
such Acquiror stock is contrary to the concept of continuity of
interest.
This Part has offered a different argument by
emphasizing the change in proportionate interest
experienced by the Target shareholder, rather than the
marketable nature of the Acquiror stock received. That a
public market exists in which a former Target shareholder
can easily dispose of his newly received Acquiror stock
following a merger does not necessarily mean that the Target
shareholder is not able to continue his proprietary interest.
After all, a large privately held Target could just as easily
merge into a large publicly held Acquiror, with the Target
shareholders receiving marketable Acquiror stock in the
merger. The more compelling indication that continuity of
interest may not exist following this type of merger is that a
former Target shareholder’s basic role within the enterprise
and stake in its value (represented by proportionate interest)
may have changed significantly as a result of the merger.103

101

For example, Professors Bittker and Eustice observe that “the
merger of an independent corner grocery store into a national food chain”
is a reorganization, even though “the local merchant who has exchanged
his stock for the marketable stock of the surviving corporation may feel,
quite rightly, that he has sold out.” BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 4,
¶ 12.01. See also A.L.I., supra note 20, at 162.
102
See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 162.
103
A likely rebuttal to the arguments presented above is that they
place too much weight on the change in the nature of Farmer Brown’s
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C. The Escrow Rules
In certain circumstances, Target shareholders may
receive little or even no Acquiror stock in a transaction that
technically satisfies the continuity of interest requirement.
A merger agreement may contemplate merger consideration
that consists of at least some Acquiror stock, but it may also
require that a portion of that consideration be placed in an
escrow account to secure a Target’s customary pre-closing
covenants or representations and warranties.104 A Target
may make certain representations and warranties regarding
its business to an Acquiror through a provision in the merger
agreement.105 The merger agreement could provide that,
after the merger, the Acquiror will be entitled to be
indemnified by the former shareholders of the Target for
damages resulting from any breaches of these
representations. Under rules that the Treasury has recently
enacted, Acquiror stock placed in escrow still counts toward
satisfying the continuity of interest requirement, even
though Target shareholders may never receive it.106
Many members of the tax community have praised the
new escrow rules as helpful to taxpayers engaging in realworld transactions where such escrow mechanisms are
proprietary interest. What if Farmer Brown did not exchange his Small
Cheesecorp stock for Big Cheesecorp stock, but instead took Small
Cheesecorp public through an initial public offering? Because Farmer
Brown’s retained interest in Small Cheesecorp would likely become more
diluted and liquid, would we argue that Farmer Brown has experienced a
realization event as a result of a change to the nature of his investment?
The key difference between that hypothetical and a merger qualifying as a
reorganization is that in the merger, Farmer Brown actually exchanges
his Small Cheesecorp stock for something completely different—Big
Cheesecorp stock.
104
For a thorough explanation of such escrow agreements, see Elliott
V. Stein, Negotiating the Purchase Agreement for a Closely Held Business,
SK065 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 441 (2005).
105
Representations in a merger agreement may address tax,
corporate, environmental, litigation, and other potential areas of liability
exposure for an Acquiror.
106
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(iii)(D) (as amended in 2005). See
GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 4, ¶ 610.2.
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commonplace.107 Few, however, have commented on the
escrow rules’ contribution to the illusory nature of continuity
of interest. If the merger consideration that is earmarked for
an escrow account in a part-cash, part-stock merger is some
or all of the Acquiror stock, then Target shareholders may
not receive this stock at all. Rather, that escrowed stock
may remain in the escrow account indefinitely (or at least for
a very long period of time).108
For example, returning to Big Cheesecorp’s merger with
Small Cheesecorp, assume that instead of paying Farmer
Brown merger consideration consisting entirely of Big
Cheesecorp stock, the parties agree that Big Cheesecorp will
pay Farmer Brown 400 shares of Big Cheesecorp stock
(worth $40,000 in the aggregate) and $60,000 cash. The
aggregate merger consideration on its face satisfies the
continuity of interest requirement because forty percent of it
is Acquiror stock. The parties agree that an escrow account
will be created and that a portion of the merger
consideration will be placed in this escrow account. If Big
Cheesecorp suffers damages after the merger because some
of Farmer Brown’s representations in the merger agreement
are breached, then Big Cheesecorp will be indemnified solely
with funds from the escrow account.109
The merger
agreement also provides that Farmer Brown will not be
entitled to vote any of the Big Cheesecorp stock held in the
escrow account. Nor will any of this stock accumulate
dividends. The parties agree that Big Cheesecorp will be
entitled to maximum indemnification of $30,000 from the

107

The new regulation is particularly helpful in that it does not
contain many of the requirements that the IRS previously imposed when
issuing private letter rulings where stock of an Acquiror in a
reorganization was deposited into an escrow account. See Rev. Proc. 8442, 1984-1 C.B. 521.
108
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(iii)(D) (as amended in 2005).
109
This mechanism may be especially attractive to Farmer Brown if
he knows of any significant potential liability that may result from a
breach of his representations because it caps the total amount of Farmer
Brown’s possible indemnification at the value of the Acquiror stock
deposited into the escrow account.
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escrow account, so 300 shares of the Big Cheesecorp stock
(worth $30,000) to which Farmer Brown is entitled will be
deposited into the escrow account. After the 300 shares of
Big Cheesecorp stock are deposited into the escrow account,
the merger consideration that Farmer Brown actually
receives consists of approximately 86 percent cash and 14
percent Big Cheesecorp stock.110 Table 2 below illustrates
the proportions of aggregate merger consideration consisting
of Big Cheesecorp stock that Farmer Brown would receive
depending on whether or not an escrow account is used.
Table 2. Proportions of Merger Consideration Consisting of
Big Cheesecorp Stock Where an Escrow Account Is Used
Versus No Escrow Account

Value of Cash Received
Value of Big Cheesecorp Stock
Received

Proportion of Aggregate Merger
Consideration Consisting of Big
Cheesecorp Stock

Assuming
Escrow Account

Assuming No
Escrow Account

$60,000

$60,000

$10,000
(100 shares @
$100 per share)

$40,000
(400 shares @ $100
per share)

14%

40%

Under the Treasury’s recently enacted regulations, the
merger in this example would satisfy the continuity of
interest requirement and receive tax-favored reorganization
treatment. Even though the aggregate merger consideration
that Farmer Brown actually receives consists of only 14
percent Big Cheesecorp stock (rather than at least 40
percent Big Cheesecorp stock), Farmer Brown is still deemed
to have “continued” his proprietary interest because he
received a “substantial” interest in Big Cheesecorp.
The regulations provide that if the Big Cheesecorp stock
held in escrow is eventually forfeited and returned to Big
110

$10,000 worth of Big Cheesecorp stock divided by $70,000 of
aggregate merger consideration equals approximately 14 percent Big
Cheesecorp stock.
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Cheesecorp, then the escrowed stock counts against the
merger’s satisfaction of the continuity of interest
requirement.111 However, the regulations do not require that
Farmer Brown be entitled to vote the Big Cheesecorp stock
held in escrow or that the Big Cheesecorp stock held in
escrow accrue dividends paid by Big Cheesecorp on its
stock.112 Indeed, the regulations do not require that the Big
Cheesecorp stock held in escrow be released to Farmer
Brown at all.113
The escrowed stock example is another illustration of the
continuity of interest fiction.
On paper, the merger
agreement provides that Farmer Brown will own 400 shares
of Big Cheesecorp stock after the merger. In reality, Farmer
Brown does not exercise any of the typical rights of
ownership over the shares held in escrow. The merger
consideration that Farmer Brown actually receives following
the merger consists of a very small proportion (14 percent) of
Acquiror stock. The regulations pretend that Farmer Brown
owns the 300 escrowed Big Cheesecorp shares for purposes of
testing continuity of interest even though he does not possess

111

Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 2 (as amended in 2005).
Id. Prior to the issuance of these regulations, whether escrowed
stock counted towards satisfying the continuity of interest requirement
was a major concern of practitioners. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Sec.,
Treatment of Variable Stock Consideration in Tax-Free Corporate
Reorganizations (Feb. 4, 2004), available in 102 TAX NOTES 864 (2004)
(escrowed stock should be treated as owned by Target shareholders). As
the 2004 New York State Bar Association Report indicates, “The primary
indicia of stock ownership are (1) formalities of title (although these are
given limited weight), (2) right to dividends, (3) ability to exercise voting
power, (4) power to dispose of the stock, (5) opportunity for gain and (6)
risk of loss . . . .” Id.
113
The Big Cheesecorp stock could remain in the escrow account until
the statute of limitations applicable to the reorganization has expired.
After this point, the Big Cheesecorp stock in the escrow account could be
released to Big Cheesecorp without enabling the IRS to apply the portion
of the Treasury regulations that would cause this stock to count against
the continuity of interest requirement.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.3681(e)(2)(iii)(D) (as amended in 2005).
112
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any of the “primary indicia of stock ownership”114 over these
shares.

D. “Mere Dispositions” and Post-Reorganization
Continuity
If the concept of continuity of interest is that Target
shareholders “preserve” or “continue” their proprietary
interests following a merger by holding stock in the Acquiror,
then post-reorganization sales of this Acquiror stock could
rightfully be viewed as severing continuity.115 However, due
to the burdens imposed on taxpayers, the Treasury
effectively abolished the post-reorganization continuity of
interest requirement in 1998.116
The 1998 Treasury regulations have been widely praised
by tax commentators as making the continuity of interest
requirement workable in modern business transactions.
Taxpayers are now able to execute mergers without worrying
that sales by Target shareholders of Acquiror stock after a
merger could violate the continuity of interest requirement.
This view, however, is shortsighted. While the new rules are
a powerful display of administrative relief, certain aspects of

114

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Treatment of Variable Stock
Consideration in Tax-Free Corporate Reorganizations (Feb. 4, 2004),
available in 102 TAX NOTES 864 (2004).
115
Indeed, in the “How Long” decisions, the courts held that sales of
Acquiror stock by Target shareholders after a merger could cause the
transaction to fail the continuity of interest requirement. See, e.g., Heintz
v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 132 (1955) (holding that continuity of interest was
severed where Target shareholders received Acquiror stock on the
condition that they receive assistance from the Acquiror in selling that
stock after the merger); see also McDonald’s Rest. v. Comm’r, 688 F.2d 520
(7th Cir. 1982) (the sale of Acquiror corporation stock immediately
following a merger and pursuant to a pre-merger plan caused the merger
to fail the continuity of interest requirement even though the target
shareholders were not under a binding obligation to sell).
116
See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005). In its preamble
to these regulations, the government stated that the regulations will
“greatly enhance administrability in this area.” T.D. 8760, 1998-1 C.B.
803.
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the rules contribute significantly to the fiction underlying
the continuity of interest doctrine.
The 1998 Treasury regulations provide that postreorganization sales of Acquiror stock by Target
shareholders are disregarded for continuity of interest
purposes as “mere dispositions” as long as the Target
shareholders do not sell the stock to the Acquiror or to a
party “related” to the Acquiror.117 Thus, immediately after a
merger is consummated, Target shareholders may sell much
of the Acquiror stock they received in the merger to a third
party for cash and still receive tax-deferred treatment on the
Acquiror stock they retain.118 This rule tests continuity of
interest by taking a snapshot at the moment a merger closes.
But, even this snapshot image of continuity of interest is
illusory.
As discussed above, Target shareholders can
dispose of the Acquiror stock that they receive immediately
following the merger without violating continuity. The 1998
Treasury regulations disregard these sales even if they occur
pursuant to a pre-existing, binding written contract.119 A
Target shareholder can arrange to dispose of Acquiror stock
that it will receive in a merger—even before owning it—
without impinging upon continuity of interest.
Returning to our example, assume that Farmer Brown
agreed to exchange his Small Cheesecorp stock for merger
consideration consisting of $60,000 cash and 400 shares of
Big Cheesecorp stock (worth $40,000 in the aggregate).
Farmer Brown could sign a binding written contract, before
the merger even closes, to transfer to a third party 300 of the
shares that he will receive in the merger for $30,000 cash.

117

See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
In fact, the 1998 Treasury regulations enable a Target shareholder
to dispose of all of the Acquiror stock it receives immediately after a
reorganization without infringing upon the continuity of interest
requirement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
119
Id. § 1.368-1(e)(7), ex. 1 (as amended in 2006) (merger in which
Target shareholder receives cash and Acquiror stock and, immediately
after the merger, disposes of all of the Acquiror stock it received to a third
party pursuant to a “preexisting binding contract” does not violate the
continuity of interest requirement).
118
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Immediately after the merger closes, therefore, Farmer
Brown would hold a total of $90,000 cash and one hundred
shares of Big Cheesecorp stock (worth $10,000 in the
aggregate), meaning that a mere 10 percent of the aggregate
consideration he receives would consist of Big Cheesecorp
stock.
Table 3 below illustrates the proportion of the aggregate
merger consideration delivered to Farmer Brown that
consists of Big Cheesecorp stock assuming that Farmer
Brown enters into a pre-existing binding contract to sell to a
third party and, alternatively, assuming that he does not
enter into such a contract.
Table 3. Proportion of Merger Consideration Consisting of
Big Cheesecorp Stock Where Farmer Brown Enters into a
Pre-Existing Binding Contract to Sell Versus Situation
Where No Pre-Existing Binding Contract to Sell Exists

Value of Cash Received
from Big Cheesecorp
Value of Cash Received
from Third Party
Value of Stock Received
from Big Cheesecorp
Proportion of Aggregate
Merger Consideration
Consisting of Big
Cheesecorp Stock that
Farmer Brown Receives

Assuming PreExisting Binding
Contract to Sell
$60,000

Assuming No PreExisting Binding
Contract to Sell
$60,000

$30,000

$0

$10,000 (100 shares @
$100 per share)

$40,000 (400 shares @
$100 per share)

10%

40%

Does the end result here indicate that Farmer Brown
received $90,000 in cash and $10,000 worth of Big
Cheesecorp stock in the merger? Although Farmer Brown
sold most of his Big Cheesecorp stock before he even owned it,
according to the continuity of interest doctrine (as modified
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by the 1998 Treasury regulations), the answer is “no.”120
Farmer Brown benefited from tax-deferred treatment of the
one hundred shares of Big Cheesecorp stock that he did
retain because he “continued” his proprietary interest
following the merger.121
Another aspect of the 1998 Treasury regulations that
contributes to the continuity of interest fiction involves the
requirement that the Target shareholders may not sell the
Acquiror stock received in a reorganization to parties
“related” to the Acquiror.122 This rule makes intuitive sense.
If the Acquiror’s wholly owned subsidiary or sole shareholder
could acquire for cash the Acquiror stock received by former
Target shareholders in the merger, then, effectively, the
Acquiror could deliver cash, and not stock, to those
shareholders.123
A major inconsistency in these rules, however, is that
only a corporation can technically qualify as a “related
person.”124 If an individual, rather than a corporation, owns
100 percent of an Acquiror, this individual shareholder is not
considered to be a person “related” to the Acquiror.125
Consequently, in a statutory merger, an Acquiror that is

120

See id.
If the continuity of interest doctrine viewed Farmer Brown as
receiving $90,000 in cash and $10,000 worth of Big Cheesecorp stock, then
Farmer Brown would realize a taxable gain equal to the difference
between the full $100,000 of merger consideration and his adjusted basis
in his Small Cheesecorp stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1996).
122
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(7), ex. 1 (as amended in 2005).
123
An Acquiror’s wholly owned corporate subsidiary qualifies as a
“related person” to the Acquiror. Id. § 1.368-1(e)(4). It is logically
consistent that this rule would also apply to shareholders in control of the
Acquiror.
124
Id. § 1.368-1(e)(4)(i). Generally, a person is related to the Acquiror
under these regulations if either (A) the two corporations are members of
the same affiliated group, as defined in I.R.C. § 1504 (2005) (without
regard to I.R.C. § 1504(b)) (2005) or (B) (2005) the purchase of stock by one
corporation would be treated as a distribution in redemption of stock of the
first corporation under § 304(a)(2) (without regard to Treas. Reg. § 1.150280(b) (2005)).
125
Id.
121
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wholly-owned by an individual shareholder can agree to
deliver aggregate merger consideration consisting of $60,000
cash and 400 Acquiror shares (worth $40,000 in the
aggregate) to Target shareholders in exchange for their
Target stock; prior to the consummation of the merger, the
individual sole shareholder of the Acquiror can also make an
agreement with the Target shareholders to repurchase 300 of
the Acquiror shares for $30,000 cash immediately after the
merger closes. Even though the Target shareholders in such
a transaction only receive merger consideration consisting of
10 percent Acquiror stock, because the Target shareholders
agree to sell a portion of their Acquiror stock to a person that
is “unrelated” to the Acquiror (the individual sole
shareholder), the continuity of interest requirement is
satisfied.126
Despite the rule restricting an Acquiror’s postreorganization repurchase of its stock for cash from Target
shareholders, there are also certain instances in which an
Acquiror can repurchase for cash the very Acquiror shares
that it delivered to Target shareholders in a reorganization
without adversely implicating continuity of interest. In
Revenue Ruling 99-58,127 the IRS ruled that an Acquiror’s
post-reorganization stock repurchases did not infringe upon
continuity of interest where the Acquiror repurchased these
shares to “prevent dilution resulting from the issuance of
[Acquiror] shares in the merger” pursuant to a pre-existing
stock repurchase program.128
This ruling, however, enables Acquirors to establish a
vehicle by which to provide cash directly to Target
shareholders in exchange for their interests in the

126

Id. § 1.368-1(e)(7), ex. 1.
Rev. Rul. 99-58, 1999-2 C.B. 701.
128
Id. Several commentators have noted the significance of Rev. Rul.
99-58 in that it directly contradicts Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in
2005). See, e.g., Joseph Calianno, The Impact of Stock Repurchase
Programs on Corporate Reorganizations, 2 BUS. ENTITIES 12, 16 (2000)
(“[This Ruling] deviates from the example in the Regulations in that there
is a direct modification of the issuing corporation’s stock repurchase
program caused by the reorganization”).
127
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Acquiror.129 Indeed, in the ruling the Acquiror “modified” its
stock repurchase program to enable it to acquire “a number
of its shares equal to the number issued in the acquisition of
[Target].”130 An Acquiror may publicly announce its plans to
institute a stock repurchase program after the merger is
Even with such a program in place,
consummated.131
satisfaction of the continuity of interest requirement is not
threatened, and participating shareholders will not be taxed
on the Acquiror stock that they do not sell back to the
Acquiror.
The 1998 regulations and Revenue Ruling 99-58 have
been lauded as positive developments.132 But, because they
enable parties to satisfy the continuity of interest doctrine
even when Target shareholders ultimately retain little
Acquiror stock, they highlight how the doctrine, as applied
today, fails to achieve its intended purpose.

E. Fictional Equity
The continuity of interest doctrine requires that
shareholders of a Target receive a substantial, material, and
definite interest in the Acquiror.133 The doctrine, however,
merely requires that Target shareholders in a reorganization
receive an instrument from the Acquiror bearing the label

129

Taxpayers have also observed that Rev. Rul. 99-58 does not set any
parameters regarding the amount of Acquiror stock that may be
repurchased without compromising continuity.
See, e.g., Mark J.
Silverman, Current Developments in Tax-Free Corporate Reorganizations,
SK028 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 2751, 2813 (2004) (“[i]t is unclear to what extent the
size of the repurchase matters. Query whether . . . [Acquiror] may, for
example, repurchase 90 percent of its stock in a stock repurchase
program”).
130
Id. at 2812.
131
There are a number of ways in which an Acquiror can inform the
Target shareholders of the share repurchase program, including through
public press releases or proxy statements.
132
See, e.g., Calianno, supra note 128, at 14.
133
See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005); Helvering v.
Minn. Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 386 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Comm’r, 287 U.S. 462, 471 (1933).
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“equity,” no matter how tenuous the equity characteristics of
this instrument.134
Almost any type of Acquiror stock—even preferred
stock—will serve as valid consideration for continuity of
interest purposes.135 Preferred stock—as opposed to common
stock—holders generally receive a fixed dividend from an
Acquiror and do not participate in the potential economic
growth of the Acquiror.136
The courts and the IRS have ruled that Target
shareholders may qualify as holding a sufficient continuing
interest in the Acquiror where they receive merger
consideration consisting of cash and non-voting preferred
stock of the Acquiror that is redeemable for cash by the
Acquiror at any time.137 Thus, if Farmer Brown exchanged
his Small Cheesecorp common stock for mandatorily
redeemable, non-voting preferred stock in Big Cheesecorp, he
would be deemed to have received a definite, material, and
substantial proprietary interest that would satisfy
continuity. In reality, the interest that Farmer Brown
receives in Big Cheesecorp is significantly less equity-like
than the common stock he held in Small Cheesecorp.
The tax law even treats so-called “non-qualified preferred
stock” as a sufficient equity interest in the Acquiror when it

134

See Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 111. See also Schweitzer &
Conrad, Inc. v. Comm’r, 41 B.T.A. 533, 542 (1940).
135
See John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 378 (1935)
(Target shareholders’ receipt of merger consideration, 38.5 percent of
which consisted of non-voting preferred Acquiror stock, satisfied the
continuity of interest requirement.).
136
19 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2:56 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2004).
137
Schweitzer & Conrad, Inc., 41 B.T.A. at 550 (continuity of interest
was satisfied where one corporation acquired all of the assets of another in
exchange for preferred stock and cash, even though the preferred stock
could be redeemed at any time on 30 days notice at par plus accumulated
and unpaid dividends, and where the parties took steps within two months
of the merger to redeem a substantial portion of this stock); Rev. Rul. 78142, 1978-1 C.B. 111 (mandatorily redeemable preferred stock provides
sufficient continuity of interest).
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comes to testing continuity of interest.138 Congress has
considered this type of stock to be so similar to debt that
when Target shareholders receive it in a merger, they are
taxed on it.139 Yet despite this designation, the tax law
respects non-qualified preferred stock as stock in
determining whether Target shareholders have continued
their interest in the Acquiror.140
The contrast between the continuity of interest doctrine’s
treatment of “fictional” equity (i.e., non-voting, mandatorily
redeemable preferred stock) of the Acquiror and its
treatment of long-term debt of the Acquiror is striking. The
courts have held that 100-year bonds of an Acquiror do not
provide sufficient continuity.141 Receipt of these types of debt
interests probably compels former Target shareholders to
maintain an even more significant continuing interest in the
assets of the former Target than if the former Target
shareholders had received stock. But because 100-year
bonds do not bear the required “stock” label, they are not
considered to provide former Target shareholders with a
sufficient continuing interest in the Acquiror.142
The obsessive focus of the continuity of interest doctrine
on “equity” as the only viable form of proprietary interest in

138
See TREASURY BLUE BOOK 213 (1997) (nonqualified preferred stock
will be respected for continuity of interest purposes “unless and until
Treasury regulations are issued requiring a different result”). See also
GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 4, ¶ 610.1.1, n.26 (“Treasury’s extensive
regulatory authority under [this Section] presumably could be exercised to
declare all [nonqualified preferred stock] bad consideration (‘not stock’) in
testing [continuity of interest], but nothing suggests that Treasury is
likely to do anything of the sort.”).
139
I.R.C. § 356(e) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.356-6(a) (as amended in
2000) (nonqualified preferred stock treated as boot at shareholder level).
140
See TREASURY BLUE BOOK, supra note 138, at 213.
141
Roebling v. Comm’r, 143 F.2d 810, 813-14 (3d Cir. 1944) (Target
shareholder’s exchange of stock in Target for Acquiror’s 100-year bonds
with a fixed 8 percent return pursuant to a merger did not satisfy
continuity of interest requirement, even though Target shareholder’s
economic position did not change significantly.).
142
Id. See also Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 421-22 (1940) (longterm debt does not create holders of “proprietary interest”).
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the Acquiror adds to the fiction. In many cases, the Acquiror
stock that Target shareholders receive in a reorganization
does not contain concrete equity-like characteristics. In
almost every other aspect of the tax law, whether an
instrument represents equity or not is a difficult and
important question.143 The continuity of interest doctrine, on
the other hand, does not adopt such a nuanced approach.

F. A Meaningless Tradition
This Part has demonstrated that the continuity of
interest doctrine fails to achieve its intended purpose.
Although the doctrine attempts to ensure that a substantial
number of former Target shareholders continue to own an
interest in the Acquiror following a reorganization, this
objective is often unfulfilled. At the most basic level, it is
very difficult to argue that, in many reorganizations, Target
shareholders receive or retain interests in the Acquiror that
could be described as a substantive “continuation” of their
interests in the Target.
The continuity of interest fiction is the product of
misguided judicial intervention coupled with administrative
relief. Soon after the birth of Congress’s reorganization
provisions, judges, not Congress, decided that continued
Target shareholder ownership following a merger was a
characteristic trait of a merger that was a mere change in

143
For example, if a corporation issues an instrument that is
respected as debt, then payments by the corporation with respect to that
instrument may be deductible interest payments instead of non-deductible
dividend payments. For fine works addressing the debt/equity question in
other contexts, see Adam O. Emmerich, Hybrid Instruments and the DebtEquity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118 (1985);
Louis S. Freeman & Richard M. Lipton, Tax Consequences of Business and
Investment-Driven Uses of Derivatives, 72 TAXES 947 (1994); David P.
Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New Financial
Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499 (1994); William Plumb, The Federal
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a
Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369 (1971); Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions:
Debt and Equity Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761
(1998).
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form.144 Without acknowledging the questionable nature of
this premise, the Treasury, the IRS, and the courts created
so many requirements to comply with this judicial ideal that
the doctrine became onerous and impractical. Over the past
ten years, the Treasury and the IRS have, in effect, conceded
that the doctrine is not viable by significantly liberalizing its
requirements.145 This relief has contributed to the fiction
and has lead to the doctrine’s persistence today as a
meaningless tradition that the tax law continues to observe
with “religious-like obeisance.”146
The continuity of interest doctrine fails to distinguish
between a special merger deserving of reorganization status
and one that is an ordinary sale. The continued ownership
by former Target shareholders following a merger that
qualifies as a reorganization looks very similar to that by
former Target shareholders following a taxable merger.
Because the doctrine does not adequately serve as a means
for determining what types of mergers ought to receive
Congress’s special tax treatment, a new approach is needed.

V. THE END OF CONTINUITY: A NEW APPROACH
The continuity of interest doctrine is fundamentally and
practically flawed. Instead of refining the continuity of
interest rules further, we should consider an alternative way
to determine whether a merger will enjoy tax-favored
treatment.
Any replacement for the continuity of interest doctrine
should consider the significance of the reorganization
provisions of the Code in the context of the realization rule.
A fundamental principle underlying our tax system is that

144
See supra Part II for further discussion of the judicial development
of the doctrine.
145
Indeed, when the Treasury issued the 1998 regulations, it stated
explicitly that the purpose of these regulations was to quell taxpayer
uncertainty regarding satisfaction of the minimum Acquiror stock
threshold. T.D. 8760, 1998-1 C.B. 803. See also Rev. Rul. 99-58, 1999-52
I.R.B. 701; Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) (as amended in 2005).
146
Wolfman, supra note 4.
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without a realization event, no income arises that can be the
subject of current taxation.147 With very few exceptions, the
taxpayer experiences a realization event only when he
exchanges his investment for something “materially
different” (or when the taxpayer is deemed to have done
so).148
Mergers that qualify as reorganizations under current
law are an exception to the realization rule. This exception
is remarkable, especially in light of the sheer dollar value of
tax revenue at stake in many mergers and that in a
reorganization, corporate- and shareholder-level taxes are
not imposed.
Congress’s oft-stated rationale for the
exception is that certain mergers represent mere
readjustments—“purely paper transactions” and “mere
changes in form”149—rather than ordinary sales transactions.
An effective set of rules should deliver tax-favored
treatment to mergers that appear to be mere changes in
corporate form and where shareholders experience purely
paper transactions. Thus, the key task is identifying the
distinguishing characteristics of these special mergers. This
Article’s Proposal asserts that the corporate- and
shareholder-level characteristics described below should be
present in a merger in order for a Target and its
shareholders to enjoy an exemption from the realization rule.
First, the Proposal emphasizes that the fundamental
corporate-level trait of a merger that is a mere change in
form is that the Acquiror continues the historic business of
the Target in a real and meaningful way. Unlike current law
or past proposed alternatives, the Proposal offers strict rules
mandating that the Acquiror conduct the Target’s historic
business for at least a set amount of time after a merger.
Further, the Proposal places other restrictions on the
147

Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1996). For a description and discussion
of the realization rule, see Schenk, supra note 58.
148
See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (exchange of
property triggers realization event when exchanged properties are
“materially different”).
149
H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 16 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-398, at 17-18
(1924); S. REP. NO. 65-617, pt. 1, at 5 (1918).
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Acquiror’s post-merger conduct of a Target’s historic
business and specific uses of a Target’s historic business
assets. Whether a merger should be treated as an ordinary
sale or as a special transaction, therefore, should depend on
the extent to which the Acquiror continues the historic
business of the Target following a merger.
Second, the Proposal contains a set of shareholder-level
requirements intended to exempt Target shareholders from
the realization rule where they engage in a purely paper
transaction by exchanging Target stock for Acquiror stock.
In a major departure from both current law and past
proposed alternatives, the Proposal considers whether a
Target shareholder’s voting rights and percentage interest in
the enterprise have changed dramatically as a result of a
merger.
The Proposal represents a new alternative to the
continuity of interest doctrine. Where the continuity of
interest doctrine serves a fictitious premise, the Proposal
restores some sense of truth to the mere-change-in-form and
purely-paper-transaction depictions.
Before continuing further, one caveat is necessary.
Neither the Proposal nor the rest of this Article address the
broader normative question of whether we should continue
Congress’s special tax treatment of certain mergers. Rather,
the Proposal is intended to present a more effective and
rational approach to how we administer this special
treatment.

A. Past Proposed Alternatives
Attempts to replace the continuity of interest doctrine are
not a new phenomenon. Before examining the specific terms
of the Proposal, it is helpful to review the alternatives that
have been offered in the past.
The most well-known proposal to replace the continuity of
interest doctrine was presented by the American Law
Institute (“A.L.I.”) in its multi-year study, Federal Income
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Tax Project, Subchapter C,150 which was completed in 1980
(the “A.L.I. Report”). The A.L.I. Report was so influential
that the Senate Finance Committee eventually adopted
significant elements of its proposal in 1985 (although the
proposed legislation was not enacted).151
The A.L.I. Report proposed a bifurcation of the tax
treatment of corporate mergers:
At the corporate level, the tax treatment of a merger of a
Target into an Acquiror would be expressly elective by the
taxpayer.152 If an Acquiror in a statutory merger desired
taxable treatment, it would simply make an election to treat
the merger as a taxable sale of assets by the Target to the
Acquiror by filing a form with the IRS. The Acquiror would
then assume a cost basis in the Target’s assets.153 If, on the
other hand, an Acquiror desired tax-deferred, carryover basis
treatment, it would make no election following the merger.154
Shareholder-level consequences in a merger, under the
A.L.I. Report’s proposal, would be completely independent of
the corporate-level election. If a Target shareholder received
any amount of Acquiror stock in exchange for its Target
stock, the shareholder would recognize no gain on that
stock.155

150

See generally A.L.I., supra note 20.
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 99TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON
THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985 (Comm. Print 1985).
152
See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 145 (Proposal C4).
153
See id. (“[A]ny acquisition of assets by statutory merger or
consolidation, if the surviving corporation shall so elect, shall be treated as
if the acquired corporation had transferred its assets and distributed the
proceeds in liquidation to its shareholders, and the acquired corporation or
surviving corporation shall then be liable for all its income taxes including
those resulting from the imputed asset transfer; and the acquired
corporation’s assets shall then have a fresh cost basis in the hands of the
acquired corporation or the surviving corporation, as the case may be.”).
154
See id. at 73 (carryover basis default treatment for statutory
mergers).
155
See id. at 167 (Proposal D1) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized by
any noncorporate shareholder if stock of an acquired corporation is, in
pursuance of a plan of acquisition, exchanged solely for stock of one or
more acquiring corporations.”).
151
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Even twenty-five years after its publication, the A.L.I.
Report’s proposed alternative to the continuity of interest
doctrine has not been subject to serious challenge.156 In
describing the merits of the Proposal below, this Part will
contrast the Proposal’s ability to distinguish between
ordinary sales and special mergers with that of the A.L.I.
Report. This Part contends that the A.L.I. Report does not
achieve this objective, but instead opts to achieve a regime of
simplicity.

B. A New Approach
The Proposal presented in this Article diverges from both
current law and the alternative offered by the A.L.I. Report.
Its primary objective is to administer tax-favored treatment
to mergers where the Target’s historic business is preserved
and a Target shareholder’s role within the enterprise does
not change significantly as a result of the merger. In
contrast to the continuity of interest doctrine, the Proposal
serves these policy goals.157

1. The Proposal
The Proposal advances two sets of rules that address the
corporate- and shareholder-level tax treatment of a merger.
These rules are presented separately below:
Qualifying Merger. The first part of the Proposal is
that where (a) a Target merges into an Acquiror in a
statutory merger,158 transferring substantially all of its
assets to the Acquiror, and (b) for the two-year period

156

See, e.g., Wolfman, supra note 4 (“But for general theme and
scheme you have it all—by my lights, elegant and sensible as well as
simple and short.”); but see George Yin, A Carryover Basis Asset
Acquisition Regime: A Few Words of Caution, 37 TAX NOTES 415 (1987).
157
The A.L.I. Report also ignores these principles in an effort to serve
administrative convenience.
158
For purposes of determining what constitutes a “statutory merger,”
this proposal would retain the definition under the current reorganization
provisions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2005).

BLANK_FINAL.DOC

50

2/28/2006 10:39:53 PM

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2006

immediately following the merger, the Acquiror (i) continues
the historic business of the Target directly or (ii) uses a
substantial portion of the assets of the Target in a business
of the Acquiror that is of “like kind” to the Target’s historic
business, the merger will be treated as a “qualifying
merger.”159 The Target will not recognize taxable gain or loss
on its transfer of assets in a qualifying merger.160 The
Acquiror will hold any assets it receives from the Target as a
result of a qualifying merger with the Target’s basis (i.e., a
“carryover basis”) in the assets.161
Shareholder Non-Recognition. The second part of the
Proposal is that, as a default rule, a Target shareholder will
not recognize gain or loss on the exchange of any Target
stock for stock of an Acquiror that is a party to a qualifying
merger with the Target.
However, there are two exceptions to this default rule.
First, to the extent that a Target shareholder exchanges any
voting stock for non-voting stock, or vice versa, the exchange
will be taxable.162 Second, if, immediately after the merger,
159
This provision is intended to replace the concept of a reorganization
under I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(D) (2005) in the case of forward
mergers of the Target into the Acquiror or its subsidiary.
160
Accordingly, if a merger fails the qualifying merger requirements,
the transaction will be treated as a taxable sale of assets by the Target to
the Acquiror.
161
The term “carryover basis” generally means that the Acquiror will
hold the former Target’s assets with a basis equal to the basis of the assets
in the hands of the former Target, increased by any gain recognized by the
Target on the transfer. The relevant provisions of the Code dealing with
carryover basis treatment in a reorganization under current law can be
found in I.R.C. § 362 (2005).
162
The Proposal would not, however, repeal or otherwise implicate the
treatment of “non-qualified preferred stock” under current law. Under
I.R.C. § 351(g) (2005), stock that resembles debt and is reasonably likely to
be redeemed is treated as boot. This rule applies under current law
irrespective of whether a Target shareholder exchanges voting or nonvoting Target stock for Acquiror stock that is non-qualified preferred
stock. Congress enacted this rule to preserve the debt-equity distinction.
Because that policy objective differs from that of the Proposal, the nonqualified preferred stock rules should continue to be applied.
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the former Target shareholder’s percentage interest in the
Acquiror (measured by either vote or value) is less than 20
percent of the former Target shareholder’s percentage
interest in the Target (measured by either vote or value)
immediately prior to the merger, then the Target
shareholder’s exchange of any Target stock for Acquiror
stock will be taxable.163 In either case, if, in addition to the
Acquiror stock received in the merger, a Target shareholder
receives any cash or any property other than stock, then the
shareholder will recognize gain solely with respect to the
cash or other property received to the extent of the
shareholder’s realized gain.164 A Target shareholder’s basis
in Acquiror stock received pursuant to a qualifying merger
will be the same as the shareholder’s basis in the Target
stock he relinquished (decreased by the fair market value of
any non-stock property received and increased by any gain
that the Target shareholder recognizes).165

2. Explanation of Corporate-Level Requirements
The “qualifying merger” requirements of the Proposal are
intended to ensure that special tax treatment is applied to
mergers where the Target could be described as undergoing
a mere change in corporate form.

163
The Proposal does not simply look to decreases in the amount of
stock that a particular Target shareholder holds after a merger. Rather,
the Proposal considers decreases in the Target shareholder’s percentage
interest in the Acquiror from the Target shareholder’s percentage interest
in the Target.
164
The Proposal would also generally retain the reorganization
provisions’ treatment of boot received by Target shareholders under
current law. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(1) (2005) (“If (A) section 354 or 355 would
apply to an exchange but for the fact that (B) the property received in the
exchange consists not only of property permitted by section 354 or 355 to
be received without the recognition of gain but also of other property or
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an
amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value
of such other property.”).
165
The Proposal thus adopts the “substituted basis” rules that exist
under current law. See I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (2005).
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a. Identifying Mere Changes in Form
The Proposal grants tax-favored treatment to mergers
where the historic business of the Target survives the
merger, even though the Target, as a corporate entity, does
not. Unlike current law, the Proposal disregards the type
and composition of merger consideration that an Acquiror
delivers to Target shareholders.166 A merger receives taxfavored treatment under the Proposal if substantially all of
the Target’s assets are transferred to the Acquiror in the
merger167, and the Acquiror continues the Target’s historic
business for at least two years following the merger.168
During this two-year period, the Acquiror may fulfill the
Proposal’s historic business requirement by operating the
Target’s historic business directly or, alternatively, by using
substantially all of the Target’s assets in a business of the
166

The continuity of interest requirement causes a merger to be
wholly taxable if merger consideration that consists of less than the
required aggregate amount of Acquiror stock is paid to Target
shareholders. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e) (as amended in 2005).
167
The Proposal’s requirement that a Target transfer “substantially
all” of its assets to an Acquiror is intended to prevent taxpayers from
achieving tax-deferral with respect to inherently divisive transactions.
Without such a requirement, a Target could dispose of a large amount of
its assets to a third party and then merge into an Acquiror in a “qualifying
merger,” which would not result in current taxation under the Proposal.
The “substantially all” requirement prevents this result.
168
The two-year period used in the Proposal is intended to represent a
substantial amount of time. The choice of this amount of time is purely
arbitrary. Other sections of the Code, however, also utilize a two-year
period to monitor post-transaction activity. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 355(e) (2005).
It is possible that the required time frame could be longer or shorter than
two years, but, in the world of tax law, two years is almost an eternity.
Under the “step-transaction doctrine,” courts, the IRS, and taxpayers may
integrate the steps of a transaction to achieve a tax result that would not
be possible if each step was analyzed independently. A common factor
underlying many cases where the step-transaction doctrine was invoked
involved transactions where a series of steps occurred in close proximity to
each other. See, e.g., Murrin v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 502, 508 (1955) (“All of
the transactions occurred in one day and the first would not have
happened without a view to the last, for each of the several steps was in
pursuance of a previously agreed upon plan.”).
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Acquiror that is of “like kind” to the Target’s historic
business.
Why does the Proposal so heavily emphasize continuation
of the Target’s historic business in administering tax-favored
treatment? The reason is that the identity of the Target is
inextricably linked to the business that it conducts.169
For example, consider McDonald’s Corporation. This
corporate entity is known around the globe as an operator of
“fast-food” restaurants, and it prominently displays the
“golden arches” that are synonymous with its business as its
corporate logo.170
Consumers associate McDonald’s
Corporation with “Happy Meals” and other products of its
fast-food business.171
The investing public purchases
McDonald’s Corporation stock based on the earnings forecast
of its fast-food business (and the restaurant industry at
large).172
Moreover, lenders decide to make loans to
McDonald’s Corporation only after reviewing the
performance of McDonald’s Corporation’s business activity.173
When deciding whether to interact with McDonald’s
Corporation, these consumers, investors, and lenders all
consider the business of McDonald’s Corporation before

169

The question of whether a corporation should be treated as a
separate person with a separate personality is age-old. See, e.g., Arthur
W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 (1911)
(describing the corporate entity as a being separate from its owners as a
result of its unique characteristics); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification
of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441
(1987). One of the fundamental distinguishing characteristics of a
corporation’s identity is its primary business activity.
170
Not surprisingly, the logo does not contain a single image of the
corporation’s largest shareholder.
See McDonald’s, http://www.
mcdonalds.com (last visited Dec. 4, 2005). Dodge & Cox, Inc., McDonald’s
Corporation’s largest shareholder as of December 21, 2005 (holding 5.54
percent according to a Thomson Financial Security Report), does not
appear in any readily accessible McDonald’s Corporation promotional
material.
171
See McDonald’s Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 4,
2005).
172
See id.
173
See id.
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considering its shareholders. The unique business activity of
a corporation is its central defining characteristic.
After a merger of a Target into an Acquiror, the Target
can be described as continuing to exist, in substance, if the
Acquiror continues the Target’s historic business in a real
and meaningful way. The Proposal rejects the excessive
focus of current law on continued ownership by a Target’s
shareholders after a merger for purposes of determining
whether the Target has changed. For the many reasons
discussed in Part IV, in practice, continued ownership often
does not exist or is illusory at best. The Proposal refocuses
the rules squarely on the question of whether a Target’s
historic business, not its historic shareholder base,
continues. While current law contains rules regarding an
Acquiror’s continuation of the historic business of the Target
in a reorganization,174 those rules are extremely flexible and
easy to satisfy.175
The two-year requirement of the Proposal is an effective
means for distinguishing between mergers that are mere
changes in form and those that are ordinary sales. In an
ordinary sale, a financial investor may acquire the assets of
a Target via merger and shortly thereafter, sell the assets to
third-party buyers for cash.
Private equity funds, for
example, frequently acquire assets through mergers using a
corporate subsidiary and then quickly “flip” the assets by
selling off the pieces for cash.176 On the other hand, an
Acquiror that truly desires to conduct the Target’s historic
business may acquire the Target via merger and then
continue the Target’s historic business for a number of years.
The Proposal distinguishes between these two types of
transactions by mandating that an Acquiror conduct the
174
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2006) (“Continuity of
business enterprise (COBE) requires that the issuing corporation (P) . . .
either continue the target corporation’s (T’s) historic business or use a
significant portion of T’s historic business assets in a business.”).
175
See id.; see also BLOCK, supra note 43, at 347.
176
See Paul S. Bird, Private Equity M&A: Current Topics, 1339
PLI/CORP 11 (2002) (describing various exit strategies that private equity
funds often utilize).
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historic business of the Target for at least two years
following the merger in order to receive tax-favored
treatment. Current law, by comparison, does not contain
any explicit rule regarding the amount of time that an
Acquiror must continue a Target’s historic business.177
The Proposal’s rule that an Acquiror may satisfy the
historic business test during this two-year period by directly
conducting the Target’s business adds credibility to the
mere-change-in-form construct. When an Acquiror continues
the Target’s historic business directly, the business, with all
its unique attributes, survives the merger.178 In this case,
the corporate entity encapsulating the Target’s historic
business is the only real corporate-level alteration in such a
merger. Consequently, a mere change in the Target’s form
can be said to have occurred.
The Proposal’s alternative rule, that an Acquiror may use
substantially all of the assets of the Target in a business that
is of “like kind” to the Target’s historic business, is essential
to the mere change-in-form construct.179 Returning to an
example from Part IV, under current law, a merger of Small
Cheesecorp (which produces cheese as its primary business)
into Acme Purse Company (which produces women’s leather
products as its primary business) qualifies for tax-favored
treatment even when Acme Purse Company uses the cattle
assets of Small Cheesecorp to expand its leather product
business. In this type of merger, where the Acquiror utilizes
the Target’s assets in a business that is completely different
than that of the Target, it is difficult to argue that a mere
change in the Target’s corporate form is all that has

177

Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(1) (as amended in 2005).
Regulatory guidance would be needed to address mergers where a
Target corporation conducts more than one line of business. Such
guidance could provide that an Acquiror should only be required to
conduct the most significant line of business of the Target following a
merger.
179
The concept of a “like kind exchange” that is exempted from the
realization requirement already exists in other provisions of the Code that
provide instructive guidance for the Proposal. See I.R.C. § 1031 (2005).
178
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occurred.180 The “like kind” business requirement of the
Proposal avoids this fiction. Although exactly what types of
businesses would qualify as “like kind” is not intuitively
apparent, businesses that are part of the same industry and
produce similar products generally should be considered
“like kind.”181 Regulatory guidance would be necessary to
explain in more concrete terms what types of businesses
would qualify as “like kind.”182

b. Contrasts with the A.L.I. Report
The A.L.I. Report differs significantly from the Proposal
in considering the extent to which a Target’s historic
business continues following a merger. The A.L.I. Report
presents a detailed critique of the continuity of interest
doctrine and argues for its repeal.183 However, without
similarly detailed explanation or analysis, the A.L.I. Report
rejects the concept of the continuity of business enterprise
requirement as well.184 Under the alternative offered in the
A.L.I. Report, the Acquiror may use the Target’s business
assets for any purpose. The A.L.I. Report’s alternative would
even allow the Acquiror to cease the Target’s historic
business altogether after the merger and sell off a portion of
180
An Acquiror is only required under current law to use a significant
portion of a Target’s historic business assets in “a” business. Treas. Reg. §
1.368-1(d)(i) (as amended in 2005). This lack of specificity means that the
Acquiror can use the Target’s business assets in any type of business it
chooses, as long as the business is “a” business of the Acquiror.
181
The rules of I.R.C. § 1031 (2005), of course, would serve as a critical
foundation for determining what types of businesses would qualify as “like
kind.” Regulations underlying § 1031 provide that an exchange of a
copyright on a novel for a copyright on a song does not constitute a like
kind exchange. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(3), exs. 1 and 2 (as amended in
2002). Likewise, a cheese production business and a leather purse
production business should not be considered like kind.
182
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1, 2 (as amended in 2002).
183
See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 165.
184
The A.L.I. Report comments that “while it would be possible to
impose a continuity-of-business-enterprise requirement without a
continuity of interest requirement, many of the reasons for dispensing
with the latter would also seem to apply to the former.” Id. at 162.
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the Target’s business assets for cash.185 Thus, the A.L.I.
Report implicitly suggests that the benefit of tax deferral
should be bestowed upon mergers that represent complete
transformations of the Target.
The A.L.I. Report’s express election mechanism also fails
to consider any special characteristics of a merger before
conferring tax-favored treatment upon the merger.186 Under
the A.L.I. Report, the tax treatment of a merger does not
hinge on the Acquiror’s continuation of the Target’s historic
business (as it does under the Proposal) or on any other
special factors. Rather, the tax treatment is merely the
result of an Acquiror’s decision to file an IRS form classifying
the merger as tax-deferred or taxable.187
The A.L.I. Report’s election mechanism also could cut
against the government disproportionately and lead to
unintended abuse. The government has learned from recent
experience that taxpayer elections may be detrimental to its
interests and, at the same time, unfairly advantageous to the
taxpayer. For example, the use of “check-the-box elections”
by foreign business entities has forced the government to
spend the last several years combating taxpayer abuse.188

185

See id. at 73.
See id.
187
See id. at 41 (“The solution to the trouble is to make tax
classification explicitly elective and as independent as possible of
corporate procedural considerations.”).
188
The “check-the-box elections” allow taxpayers to elect the legal
status of an entity for tax purposes. Commentators have observed that
the use of the check-the-box election regulations in the international
context has resulted in taxpayer-favorable consequences that the Treasury
did not intend. See Jeffrey L. Rubinger, Tax Court Upholds ‘Check and
Sell’ Strategy to Avoid Subpart F Income: Has Pandora’s Box Been Opened,
THE M&A TAX REPORT, VOL. 13:2 (2004) (“Since the final check-the-box
Regulations were issued in December of 1996, taxpayers have been
devising strategies to exploit them in ways that the drafters probably
never intended.”). Most recently, taxpayers have successfully utilized the
check-the-box regulations to avoid inclusions of “Subpart F income.” See
Dover Corporation, 122 T.C. No. 19 (2005) (check-the-box election of a
lower-tier subsidiary filed just before the sale of its stock by its parent, a
controlled foreign corporation, characterized as a disposition of assets used
186
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Similarly, the taxpayer election for safe harbor leasing,
which was introduced in the 1980s, led to such significant
taxpayer abuse that Congress eventually repealed the
provision.189
This is not to say that all tax elections are unjustified or
harmful; on the contrary, where tax elections serve an
important policy objective or create needed clarity they can
be beneficial. However, in the case of tax-favored treatment
for corporate mergers, an election mechanism does not serve
any important policy other than to provide simplicity, and, to
be blunt, an opportunity for corporate taxpayers to decide
whether to pay current tax or not.

3. Explanation of Shareholder-Level
Requirements
The shareholder non-recognition rules of the Proposal are
intended to deliver tax-favored treatment to stock-for-stock
exchanges that could be characterized as “purely paper
transactions.”

a. Exempting Purely Paper Transactions
Under the Proposal, the aggregate amount of Acquiror
stock delivered to Target shareholders, either as a group or
individually, is completely irrelevant. As long as a Target
shareholder receives stock in an Acquiror that has
participated in a qualifying merger with the Target, the
Target shareholder does not recognize gain or loss on that
stock-for-stock exchange unless one of the exceptions in the
Proposal is triggered.190 In determining whether to confer
this special non-recognition treatment, the Proposal does not
take into account the relative proportions of stock and cash
in the controlled foreign corporation’s trade or business and thus, not
Subpart F income).
189
See Alvin C. Warren and Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax
Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752
(1982).
190
The treatment, of course, is subject to classification of the Acquiror
stock as “non-qualified preferred stock” under I.R.C. § 351(g) (2005).
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that the Target shareholders receive. Instead, the Proposal
asks whether an individual Target shareholder’s role within
the enterprise has changed significantly following a merger.
The Proposal’s treatment of a Target shareholder’s
exchange of voting stock for non-voting stock (or vice versa)
as taxable is vital to the objective of reserving shareholder
non-recognition for purely paper transactions.
The
shareholder’s right to vote generally means that the
shareholder may, at the very least, participate in the election
of the directors of a corporation.191 Those directors, in turn,
are empowered to make fundamental decisions affecting the
strategic direction of the enterprise.192 Although non-voting
stock may allow its holder to participate in the economic
growth of the corporation through dividend distributions, it
does not entitle the holder to have any say over corporate
decisionmaking (except as otherwise required by law).193
Because voting stock carries with it the ability to have a
voice in the governance of a corporation, it generally trades
at a premium to non-voting stock.194 Current law ignores the

191

See Rev. Rul. 69-126; 1969-1 C.B. 218 (preferred stock that entitles
holders to vote for three out of eight directors is considered voting stock for
federal income tax purposes); see also Erie Lighting Co. v. Comm’r, 93 F.2d
883 (1st Cir. 1937) (defining voting stock for purposes of the Revenue Act
of 1926 by negative implication).
192
Some have argued that the powers bestowed upon a board of
directors are so great that the board of directors is the key force
influencing the strategic direction of a corporation. Professor Stephen M.
Bainbridge has articulated a theory of “director primacy” which comments
that “to the limited extent to which the corporation is properly understood
as a real entity, it is the board of directors that personifies the corporate
entity.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
193
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in
Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002) (describing the
importance of shareholder voting and proposing that shareholders be
required to approve takeover transactions).
194
See Paul J. Much & Timothy J. Fagan, The Value of Voting Rights,
in FINANCIAL VALUATION: BUSINESSES AND BUSINESS INTERESTS (1996)
(finding 1.15 percent to 2.83 percent premium for voting stock over nonvoting stock); Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell & Wayne H. Mikkelson,
The Market Value of Control in Publicly Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN.
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importance of a Target shareholder’s loss or gain of voting
rights as a result of a merger that qualifies as a
reorganization.195 This aspect of the tax law contributes
directly to the continuity of interest fiction described in Part
IV.
The Proposal seeks to cure this fiction by treating such a
dissimilar exchange as something more than a purely paper
transaction. If a Target shareholder gives up stock that
entitled him to vote in exchange for stock that carries no
such voting right (or vice versa), that Target shareholder
should not be treated for tax purposes as though no
substantive change has occurred.196 This aspect of the
Proposal considers not only the question of whether a Target
shareholder has exchanged stock for stock, but more
specifically, whether that shareholder has received stock
that bears significantly different rights than that which he
relinquished.
Similarly, the disproportionate ownership reduction test
under the Proposal underscores the need to consider changes
in a Target shareholder’s relative position as a shareholder
following a merger. Under the Proposal, a greater-thaneighty-percent decrease (by vote or value) in a shareholder’s

ECON. 439 (1983) (finding 5.44 percent premium for voting stock over nonvoting stock).
195
Neither I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (2005) (forward mergers of Target into
Acquiror) nor I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) (2005) (forward mergers of Target into
Acquiror’s subsidiary) require the stock that Target shareholders receive
pursuant to the reorganization to consist of Acquiror voting stock.
Consequently, a Target shareholder may exchange Target voting stock for
Acquiror non-voting stock, and vice versa, in a merger that satisfies either
of these provisions.
196
The rules regarding changes to the terms of debt instruments look
to whether the debt instrument has undergone a “significant
modification,” in which case the holder is treated as exchanging the old
instrument for a new one in a taxable exchange. Treas. Reg. § 1.10013(c)(1) (1996). Here, a Target shareholder actually exchanges old stock for
new stock and the new stock bears significantly different rights and
privileges in comparison to the old stock. The same principles that apply
in the deemed debt exchange context should apply in an actual stock
exchange context as well.
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percentage interest following a merger leads to current
taxation of the shareholder’s stock-for-stock exchange. (The
Proposal refers to percentage interest in terms of both “vote”
and “value” because it considers such a significant downward
change in a shareholder’s voting power or share of the value
of the enterprise to merit relaxation of the default
shareholder non-recognition rule.197)
This rule effectively addresses mergers of corporations
with few shareholders into corporations with many
shareholders.198 Such mergers would most likely trigger
dramatic downward shifts in a Target shareholder’s
proportionate ownership interest (by vote or value).199
Returning to an example from Part IV, Farmer Brown’s
exchange of Small Cheesecorp stock for Big Cheesecorp
stock—where his percentage interest plummeted from 100
percent to .001 percent—should not be deemed a purely
paper transaction. Farmer Brown’s voice in corporate affairs
and his proportionate rights to the assets of the enterprise
are completely different as a result of the merger. If a
general goal of the tax system is to identify realization
events (where taxpayers exchange property for “materially
different property”),200 then this type of exchange ought to be
considered an event that merits current taxation.

197
For an excellent discussion of the difference between voting and
non-voting stock for purposes of I.R.C. §§ 368(c), 1504 (2005), see Stuart
Lazar, The Definition of Voting Stock and the Computation of Voting
Power Under Sections 368(c) and 1504(a): Recent Developments and Tax
Lore, 17 VA. TAX REV. 103 (1997).
198
The Proposal is significantly simpler than alternatives offered in
the past that would have required an Acquiror to be similar in size to the
Target, based on a number of factors, in order for special tax treatment to
apply. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, § 359(a)(1) (1954) (which would
have caused a merger to be wholly taxable in any transaction where the
Acquiror was significantly greater in size than the Target).
199
Note that the Proposal is not restricted to mergers where the
Acquiror is a public corporation, as others have suggested. Rather, it
would apply whenever there is such a disproportionate reduction in
percentage interest, irrespective of the public or private nature of the
Acquiror.
200
See Schenk, supra note 58.
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The tax law already uses the disproportionate-reductionin-percentage-interest concept in other areas of the Code.
For example, when a corporation redeems a portion of a
shareholder’s stock, the Code requires a determination of
whether the shareholder should be treated as having sold his
stock to the corporation (resulting in capital gain treatment)
or as having merely received a distribution from the
corporation (resulting in dividend treatment).201 To answer
this question, the Code looks to whether the shareholder has
experienced a “substantially disproportionate redemption of
stock,” such that the shareholder’s proportionate interest in
the corporation’s non-voting and voting stock undergoes a
dramatic reduction as a result of the redemption.202 In that
type of redemption, the shareholder is deemed to have
engaged in a sale rather than received a dividend
distribution.203 The Proposal borrows this concept and uses
it to determine whether a shareholder’s block of stock
following a merger is significantly different than before the
merger.

b. Contrasts with the A.L.I. Report
In contrast to the Proposal, the A.L.I. Report does not
require that a Target shareholder exchange stock of the
same voting character (i.e., voting or non-voting) in order to
receive non-recognition treatment. Instead, it would allow a
Target shareholder to exchange voting common stock in a
Target for redeemable non-voting preferred stock in an
Acquiror without being subject to tax.204 The A.L.I. Report
201

I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (2005).
Id. In other contexts, the Code also considers changes to particular
shareholders’ proportionate interests as a result of a variety of corporate
actions, and it taxes these increases. See I.R.C. § 305(c) (2005) (asserting
that if a shareholder’s proportionate interest in the earnings and profits or
assets of a corporation is increased as a result of a particular transaction,
a stock distribution is deemed to have occurred).
203
I.R.C. § 302(a) (2005).
204
See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 163. This result highlights a fiction
that the Target shareholder has engaged in a purely paper transaction in
the same way that the continuity of interest doctrine treats the exchange
202
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rejects out of hand any requirement that an Acquiror deliver
voting stock to Target shareholders, contending that “the
requirement for voting stock constitutes an arbitrary, formal
requirement, an occasional stumbling block . . . rather than
an effective aid to any sensible policy objective.”205
The A.L.I. Report’s implicit characterization of non-voting
stock and voting stock as equivalent types of property
ignores key differences that may affect certain shareholders
as a result of a merger.206 If a large shareholder of a Target
(who would also be a large shareholder of an Acquiror
following a merger) exchanges all of his voting stock for nonvoting stock, this shareholder’s influence over the business
enterprise is dramatically different following the merger.207
Whereas the shareholder may have possessed the ability to
“hand pick” the Target’s directors and to authorize a variety
of corporate actions prior to the merger, the shareholder will
play no such role following the merger.208 The A.L.I. Report
ignores this distinction by opting to apply its shareholder
non-recognition treatment to all exchanges of stock pursuant
to a merger.
The A.L.I. Report also falls short by rejecting a significant
downward shift in a Target shareholder’s proportionate
ownership interest following a merger as a factor that should
determine shareholder-level tax consequences. Although the
A.L.I. Report does consider the issue, it ultimately argues
of meaningful equity for significantly less meaningful equity as a
continuation of a shareholder’s proprietary interest. See also discussion in
Part IV supra; Rev. Rul. 78-142, 1978-1 C.B. 111 (stating that mandatorily
redeemable preferred stock provides sufficient continuity of interest);
Schweitzer & Conrad, Inc. v. Comm’r, 41 B.T.A. 533 (1940).
205
See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 163.
206
In fairness, the A.L.I. Report addresses all forms of reorganizations
under current law, not just statutory mergers. As a consequence of this
broader scope, the A.L.I. Report focuses significant attention on the
disparate solely-for-voting stock requirement that is applicable to certain
reorganizations, but not others. Id. at 170.
207
See Bebchuk, supra note 193.
208
Without voting stock, a shareholder generally will not be entitled to
vote for directors, but may nonetheless, be entitled to approve certain
extraordinary transactions as a matter of state law. See id.
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against taking such changes into account.209 The A.L.I.
Report comments that “it is doubtful whether large, publicly
traded corporations often go to the trouble of arranging tax
free reorganizations for the acquisition of very small or
regional enterprises.”210
Perhaps this statement was
accurate in 1980 when the A.L.I. Report was issued.
However, in the wake of the dot-com era and with the
increased use of corporate stock as acquisition currency that
has occurred since the late 1990s, this argument may no
longer be persuasive.211
Last, the A.L.I. Report severs the link between corporateand shareholder-level tax treatment in a merger. It allows
an Acquiror to make an express election to treat a merger as
taxable or tax-deferred at the corporate level, but then
creates a default non-recognition rule at the shareholder
level regardless of the election made by the Acquiror.212
Consequently, under the A.L.I. Report, there is no connection
between a Target shareholder’s tax treatment and the
election (or, for that matter, any other changes that a Target
has undergone in the merger) at the corporate level. This
approach serves no apparent policy objectives other than
administrative convenience and simplicity.
The Proposal, however, links the tax treatment at the
corporate- and shareholder-levels. It expressly conditions a
Target shareholder’s enjoyment of non-recognition treatment
on a qualifying merger having occurred at the corporate
level. These requirements include continuing to conduct the
Target’s historic business for at least two years following the

209

See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 162.
See id.
211
See Bank, supra note 57 (“One of the distinguishing features of the
1990s merger movement is that, in contrast to the junk-bond financed
takeovers of the 1980s, its primary currency is stock. . . . While stock only
comprised seven percent of the acquirer’s consideration in 1988, it
comprised sixty-seven percent in 1998.”).
212
See A.L.I., supra note 20, at 167.
210
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merger.213 That an Acquiror must continue the Target’s
historic business for such a substantial period of time after a
merger means that the former Target shareholder ultimately
holds stock in a corporation that could be described
accurately as a modified form of the Target.
If the Acquiror fails to satisfy the historic business
requirement of the Proposal at any time during the two-year
period following the merger, all former Target shareholders
lose the benefit of any non-recognition treatment.214 This
effect also serves the objective of delivering tax-favored
treatment to mere changes in corporate form because, faced
with the possibility of retroactive shareholder-level taxation
(and resulting litigation), Acquirors will likely take extra
precautions to guarantee that they do not violate the historic
business requirement of the Proposal.

C. Illustrative Examples
The following examples illustrate the terms of the
Proposal and its underlying policy justifications:
Example 1 (Base Case): Farmer Brown owns 100
percent of the voting common stock of Small Cheesecorp,
which operates a local dairy business. Farmer Brown enters
into a merger agreement with Delaware Dairy, Inc.
(“Delaware Dairy”), another local dairy business. Small
Cheesecorp will merge into Delaware Dairy in a transaction
constituting a merger under Delaware law, and Farmer
Brown will receive $70,000 cash and $30,000 worth of
Delaware Dairy voting common stock in exchange for all of
his voting common stock in Small Cheesecorp, Inc. In the
merger agreement, Delaware Dairy represents that it will
continue to operate the business of Small Cheesecorp as a
separate business or will use substantially all of the assets of

213

As a result of this condition, a Target shareholder’s tax treatment
on the receipt of Acquiror stock in a merger is linked to the Acquiror’s
satisfaction of the corporate-level requirements of the Proposal.
214
The qualifying merger condition for shareholder non-recognition
would not be satisfied in this case.
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Small Cheesecorp in the dairy business of Delaware Dairy
for the entire two-year period following the closing of the
merger. Immediately after the merger is consummated,
Farmer Brown’s percentage ownership interest in Delaware
Dairy is 45 percent, measured in terms of vote and value.
Under the Proposal, the merger in this example would
result in tax-deferred treatment at both the corporate and
shareholder levels.
First, no tax would be imposed at the corporate level on
the transfer of assets by Small Cheesecorp to Delaware
Dairy because the merger would be a qualifying merger.
Assuming that Delaware Dairy’s representation is accurate,
Delaware Dairy would continue the historic business of
Small Cheesecorp or would use its assets in a “like kind”
business of Delaware Dairy (its dairy business) for the entire
two-year period following the merger.215
Second, at the shareholder level, Farmer Brown would
not recognize gain or loss on the receipt of the Delaware
Dairy stock, but would recognize gain with respect to the
cash he receives to the extent of his realized gain on the
exchange. Under the Proposal, it is irrelevant that only 30
percent of the aggregate consideration paid to Farmer Brown
is Delaware Dairy stock.216 Farmer Brown also exchanges
voting stock for voting stock and does not experience a
greater-than-eighty-percent decrease in his percentage
ownership interest.217

215

This example highlights that, under the Proposal, taxpayers often
will be forced to rely on representations from an Acquiror regarding its
future plans for the Target’s historic business. A merger agreement may
provide that former Target shareholders could seek an indemnity from the
Acquiror in the event that a qualifying merger is recharacterized as a
taxable merger due to the Acquiror’s breach of such representations.
216
The Proposal contains no requirements regarding composition of
merger consideration paid to Target shareholders.
217
Farmer Brown’s percentage interest drops from 100 percent in the
Target to 45 percent in the Acquiror.
In order to implicate the
substantially disproportionate reduction rule of the Proposal, Farmer
Brown would need to own less than 20 percent of the Target (by vote or
value) following the merger.
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Example 2 (Failed Historic Business Requirement):
Assume the same facts as Example 1, except that within one
year of the closing of the merger, Delaware Dairy sells all of
the Small Cheesecorp assets acquired in the merger to a
third party for cash.
This variation causes the transaction to be taxable at
both the corporate and shareholder levels under the
Proposal. At the corporate level, a taxable sale would be
deemed to have occurred because the transaction would fail
to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying merger.218 The
two-year requirement that Delaware Dairy continue the
historic business of Small Cheesecorp would be violated as a
result of the third-party sale.219 At the shareholder level,
Farmer Brown would be taxed on both the stock and cash he
receives because the stock would not be stock of an Acquiror
that is a party to a qualifying merger. This variation
illustrates that under the Proposal, corporate-level actions
that cause a merger to be something more than a mere
change in form directly affect shareholder-level tax
treatment.
Example 3 (Voting Stock for Non-Voting Stock):
Assume the same facts as Example 1, except that Delaware
Dairy pays Farmer Brown non-voting stock, instead of voting
stock.
This merger would result in tax-deferred treatment at the
corporate level, but taxable treatment at the shareholder
level.
Delaware Dairy would still receive tax-deferred
treatment because it would satisfy the requirements of a
qualifying merger.
Unlike the continuity of interest
doctrine, the Proposal disregards the type of consideration
that Delaware Dairy pays to Farmer Brown in determining

218

This consequence is identical to the corporate-level tax
consequences of a failed I.R.C. § 368(1)(A) (2005) reorganization under
current law.
219
A sale to a third party of the Target’s historic business assets
constitutes a per se cessation of the Target’s historic business by the
Acquiror.
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whether a mere change in form at the corporate level has
occurred.
Farmer Brown, however, would be taxed under the
Proposal on his receipt of the non-voting stock for two
reasons. First, he exchanges his voting stock in Small
Cheesecorp for non-voting stock in Delaware Dairy. Second,
because Farmer Brown receives cash and solely non-voting
stock in Delaware Dairy, his percentage interest in terms of
voting rights decreases from 100 percent in Small
Cheesecorp to 0 percent in Delaware Dairy.220 Under the
Proposal, both of these effects warrant treating Farmer
Brown as having experienced something more than a purely
paper transaction.
Example
4
(Disproportionate
Reduction
in
Percentage Interest): Assume the same facts as Example
1, except that instead of merging into Delaware Dairy, Small
Cheesecorp merges into Big Cheesecorp, a national, publicly
traded dairy corporation with millions of shareholders. After
the merger, Farmer Brown’s percentage interest (by vote and
value) shrinks from a 100 percent interest in Small
Cheesecorp to a .001 percent interest in Big Cheesecorp.
This transaction would receive tax-deferred treatment at
the corporate level, but taxable treatment at the shareholder
level.
The merger would meet the qualifying merger
requirements.
However, Farmer Brown experiences a
greater-than-eighty-percent reduction in his percentage
interest as a result of the merger.221
This variation
illustrates that under the Proposal, a greater-than-eightypercent reduction indicates that Farmer Brown has so
drastically altered his percentage interest as a result of the

220

Farmer Brown owned 100 percent of Small Cheesecorp prior to the
merger measured by vote as a result of his ownership of all of Small
Cheesecorp’s outstanding voting stock. After the merger, when Farmer
Brown holds solely non-voting stock of Big Cheesecorp, Farmer Brown
owns 0 percent of Small Cheesecorp measured by vote.
221
In other words, Farmer Brown’s percentage interest in the
Acquiror (.001 percent) is less than 20 percent of his interest in the Target
(100 percent) immediately prior to the merger.
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merger that he should not be treated as having experienced
a purely paper transaction.

D. Potential Criticism of the Proposal
While it is an improvement over the continuity of interest
doctrine, the Proposal will not be immune to criticism. Some
may argue that the Proposal would unduly favor corporate
taxpayers to the government’s detriment, increase the
complexity of the tax provisions governing mergers, and
subject business agreements to unreasonable uncertainty.
The discussion below addresses each of these claims in turn.

1. A Corporate Windfall in Disguise?
A likely criticism of the Proposal is that it would result in
a significant increase in favorable tax treatment for
corporate taxpayers in comparison to current law. The
Proposal would create a regime in which all statutory
mergers of a Target into an Acquiror or its subsidiary would
be free from current corporate-level tax as long as the
requirements of a qualifying merger were satisfied. Critics
may argue that this default tax-deferred treatment would be
available to corporate taxpayers under the Proposal, even if
a substantial amount of the merger consideration paid to
Target shareholders is cash or other non-stock property.222
Under current law, an Acquiror is at least saddled with an
obligation to issue a certain amount of its equity to Target
shareholders.223
The Proposal would eliminate that
requirement entirely and, in doing so, critics may contend
that it would make it easy for an Acquiror to enjoy taxdeferred treatment. Critics may argue that this increased
222

This criticism reflects an inherent bias towards current law, where
we have been indoctrinated to believe that a tax-deferred corporate
transaction can only occur where at least some corporate stock is issued in
the transaction. See I.R.C. § 368 (2005).
223
In a forward statutory merger, an Acquiror must be willing to pay
merger consideration consisting of at least 40 percent Acquiror stock in
order to achieve reorganization status under current law. See Treas. Reg.
1.368-1(e)(2)(v), ex. 1 (as amended in 2005).
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tax deferral could mean a significant loss of tax revenue for
the government.
This criticism can be addressed by highlighting some of
the differences between current law and the Proposal. It is
true that the Proposal would eliminate any requirement that
an Acquiror pay a minimum amount of Acquiror stock to
Target shareholders. However, the Proposal contains an
equally onerous set of conditions for tax-deferred treatment.
A merger would not be treated as a qualifying merger under
the Proposal unless an Acquiror continued the historic
business of the Target in a specified manner for the two-year
period following the merger. In many ways, the Proposal is
tougher than current law because current law mandates only
that an Acquiror pay certain consideration at the time of a
merger and, after that point, the Acquiror enjoys relative
flexibility in its operations.224 By contrast, the Proposal
governs future actions of the Acquiror in order to ensure that
a merger receiving tax-favored treatment is, as much as
possible, a mere change in form.
The corporate windfall criticism also ignores the doublesided nature of the Proposal. Because the Proposal would
create a default regime of tax-deferred treatment for
qualifying mergers, taxpayers in certain instances would lose
the ability to recognize taxable losses. For example, if a
Target shareholder holds Target stock with a basis in excess
of its fair market value, the shareholder would not be
entitled to recognize a current taxable loss in a qualifying
merger. Also, at the corporate level, if a merger satisfies the
qualifying merger requirements, the Acquiror would hold the
Target’s assets with a carryover basis from the Target rather
than a fair market value basis.
The consequence of
carryover basis treatment is that, in the future, the Acquiror
would have a diminished opportunity to claim depreciation

224

As discussed above, the continuity of business enterprise rules
under current law are relatively easy to satisfy and do not contain any
temporal restrictions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d) (as amended in 2005);
BLOCK, supra note 43, at 347.
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deductions with respect to the Target’s assets.225 This
diminution of potential tax benefits demonstrates that the
Proposal has the potential to cut both ways. The Proposal
would either defer current taxable gain or deny current
taxable losses.226 In either case, the treatment is justified by
the policy that special types of mergers (qualifying mergers
under the Proposal) should be treated as mere changes in
form and not realization events.
The claim that the Proposal would result in large losses of
revenue is likely exaggerated. Under current law, if parties
to a merger cannot satisfy the continuity of interest doctrine,
there are still a variety of other techniques available that
achieve essentially the same beneficial tax effects as a
reorganization.
For example, if these parties desire
corporate- or shareholder-level tax deferral upon a corporate
combination, they can achieve this treatment by
restructuring a statutory merger as a tax-deferred
incorporation of assets.227 Because current law allows parties
to achieve tax-deferral with somewhat relative ease, the

225
Corporate taxpayers are generally entitled to claim depreciation
deductions for a particular asset as its utility declines over time. See
I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (2005).
226
The Proposal does not allow inconsistent treatment at the
corporate- and shareholder-levels. Under the A.L.I. Report, a merger can
result in taxable loss recognition at the corporate-level (as a result of an
election) and tax-deferred treatment at the shareholder-level. Query
whether it is possible to justify this potential double benefit to the owners
of a corporate enterprise on any policy grounds?
227
It is possible to structure a merger as a tax-deferred incorporation
of assets under I.R.C. § 351 (2005) and to achieve substantially similar tax
results as in a reorganization. The key difference is that § 351 does not
contain any limits on the amount of cash that Target shareholders may
receive in such a transaction. See Rev. Rul. 84-71, 1984-1 C.B. 106
(stating that minority shareholders receive tax-deferred treatment on
receipt of holding company stock under § 351 without regard to whether or
not there is continuity of interest). This transaction is also commonly
referred to as a “horizontal double dummy” merger or a “top hat” merger.
For a few examples of this transaction structure, see Richard W. Bailine,
Long Live the Horizontal Double Dummy, 29 CORP. TAX’N 30 (2002).

BLANK_FINAL.DOC

72

2/28/2006 10:39:53 PM

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2006

Proposal should not result in additional tax revenue loss.228
Similar levels of tax deferral should occur under the Proposal
as under current law, even if parties utilize the qualifying
merger as their transaction structure of choice.229

2. Increased Complexity
Another likely criticism of the Proposal is that it would
increase the complexity of the tax rules governing mergers.
The Proposal would require taxpayers to perform both a
corporate- and shareholder-level analysis not required by
current law in order to determine if a merger is eligible for
tax-favored treatment. Parties to a merger would likely seek
representations from an Acquiror that would address the
amount of time, and the manner in which, the Acquiror
intends to operate the Target’s business. Further, if the
Acquiror desires to use the Target’s business assets in its
own business, the parties would need to compare the
business of the Target with the business of the Acquiror and
to reach a conclusion regarding their “like kind” nature.
Target shareholders would also face increased complexity to
some extent, because they would be required to calculate
whether downward shifts in their percentage interests were
significant enough to trigger gain under the Proposal. These
added layers of complexity may make the Proposal less
desirable than current law or the A.L.I. Report’s proposed
alternative.
It is true that the Proposal requires analysis that current
law and other alternatives do not. The Proposal is more
complex than current law and other proposals because its
primary function is to identify unique characteristics of a

228

For a discussion of the many ways available under current law to
avoid gain recognition when the continuity of interest doctrine cannot be
satisfied, see Robert Willens, Techniques Abound for Avoiding Difficult
Continuity of Interest Determinations, 84 J. TAX’N 342 (1996).
229
If the Proposal were enacted, parties would likely shift from such
other techniques as the horizontal double dummy merger (which can pose
regulatory and other non-tax constraints) to the qualifying merger as a
means for combining businesses in a tax-efficient manner.
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merger that is a mere change in form or a purely paper
transaction.230 A new set of rules and factors is needed in
order to serve this purpose. By comparison, the proposal
offered by the A.L.I. Report, with its corporate election
mechanism and default shareholder non-recognition rule,
takes a relatively simple approach.231
Although the Proposal creates detailed new requirements,
the transition to its set of rules should not be overly
cumbersome. First, the Proposal would only replace the tax
provisions governing statutory mergers of a Target into an
Acquiror or its subsidiary. Effectively, these are the only
transactions that are subject to the judicial continuity of
interest doctrine under current law.232 The Proposal is not
intended to replace all provisions of the Code governing the
tax treatment of stock acquisitions, asset transfers or other
combinations.
Implementing the Proposal by statute,
therefore, would not be as burdensome as other alternatives,
such as the A.L.I. Report’s proposal.233
Second, the complexity argument is undercut by the
Proposal’s use of concepts—such as “like kind” nature and
disproportionate ownership reductions—that already exist
elsewhere in the Code.234 The government and taxpayers,
therefore, would at least have familiarity with these concepts

230

For the many reasons discussed herein, the continuity of interest
doctrine does not serve such an objective successfully.
231
Indeed, the A.L.I. Report comments that its proposal creates “a
radical simplification both in practice and in the definition and conception
of more particular issues to be dealt with.” A.L.I., supra note 20, at 7.
232
The judicially created continuity of interest requirement is only
applicable to transactions governed by I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A) (2005)
(statutory mergers of Target into Acquiror) and 368(a)(2)(D) (statutory
mergers of Target into Acquiror’s subsidiary).
233
Repeal or fundamental modification of the continuity of interest
doctrine should occur by statute rather than by administrative regulation.
If the Treasury attempts to make such significant changes to the tax
treatment of corporate reorganizations, it is possible that a court or
taxpayers could question whether it has the authority to do so.
234
See I.R.C. §§ 1031 (like kind exchange), 302(b)(2) (2005)
(substantially disproportionate redemption of stock).
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as utilized in the Proposal and would be able to employ this
knowledge in answering questions that might arise.
Last, an Acquiror could be required to deliver sufficient
information to Target shareholders regarding their
ownership interests in order to enable them to determine
whether their stock-for-stock exchanges would result in
taxable disproportionate reductions in percentage interest.235

3. Interference with Business Deals
Critics may charge that the Proposal is undesirable
because uncertainty associated with it may chill taxpayers
from entering into business combinations. If a Target’s
shareholders desire to merge their Target with the Acquiror
in a tax-deferred manner, they may be wary that the
Acquiror could fail the two-year historic business
requirement (contrary to the Acquiror’s representations at
the time of the merger). Due to the uncertain tax outcomes
that the Proposal effects, critics may contend that the
Proposal would inhibit parties from entering into mergers
where certain tax consequences are desired or may interfere
with the parties’ business negotiations.236
This criticism is best addressed by an explicit
acknowledgement that the Proposal does create a degree of
uncertainty. This uncertainty, however, is not entirely
detrimental. The requirements of the Proposal are designed
to enable tax-favored treatment to be enjoyed only in
transactions where a mere change in corporate form occurs.
The uncertainty that the Proposal may provoke would likely
motivate taxpayers to take extra precautions to guarantee
that the merger continues to be a qualifying merger from the

235

Under current law, corporations engaging in reorganizations
already distribute documentation to participating shareholders that is
required to be incorporated in shareholders’ tax returns. See Treas. Reg. §
1.368-2(b) (as amended in 2005).
236
There appears to be a consensus that “uncertainty” is one of the
continuity of interest doctrine’s greatest problems. See, e.g., Hutton, supra
note 10; Miller, supra note 15; Posin, supra note 11; Wolfman, supra note
4.
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time of the closing throughout the following two-year period.
After the merger, an Acquiror might even retain legal
counsel or accountants to ensure that the Acquiror continues
the Target’s business in the proper way and that the
intended tax treatment of the merger would be respected by
the IRS.237
The Proposal thus evokes the classic struggle between a
rules-based and a standards-based approach to tax
compliance.238 In a rules-based system, the government and
the taxpayers are guided by definite rules that dictate the
outcome of a particular transaction or position. If the
Proposal were to follow the direction of the A.L.I. Report by
adopting an expressly elective mechanism for determining
the tax treatment of a merger, it would utilize a rules-based
approach. By making an election, the taxpayer would know
in advance exactly how the transaction would be treated for
tax purposes.
In a standards-based system, the rules are not as clearcut, but instead describe a set of guidelines or factors that
determine the outcome. The Proposal adopts a standardsbased approach because it details the steps that an Acquiror
must take to continue a Target’s historic business, but it
does not provide the taxpayer with certainty that its steps
will be respected. For example, if an Acquiror could not
satisfy the historic business requirement of the Proposal by
conducting a Target’s historic business directly, it could use
substantially all of its assets in a “like kind” business.
However, the Proposal does not contain a definitive, bright
line rule for what types of businesses are “like kind.”

237

See Herlihy, supra note 73.
For a thorough discussion of rules-based versus standards-based
approaches to tax compliance, see David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About
Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215 (2002). For a more general discussion of
the role of uncertainty in law, see Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of
Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443
(2004). See also Kyle Logue, The Problem of Tax Law Uncertainty and the
Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 349 (2005) (discussing the role
of uncertainty in a taxpayer’s analysis of whether to avoid or to evade tax
law).
238

BLANK_FINAL.DOC

76

2/28/2006 10:39:53 PM

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2006

Consequently, this uncertainty could lead the taxpayer to
take extra precautions. Such actions would only strengthen
the argument that a merger qualifying for special tax
treatment under the Proposal represents a mere change in
form.
Another positive aspect of the uncertainty effect of the
Proposal is that the government would retain flexibility to
recharacterize transactions that are abusive.239 The lack of
bright lines and clearly defined terms would empower the
government to address mergers on a transaction-bytransaction basis.
The A.L.I. Report’s purely elective
mechanism, however, generally prevents the government
from rescinding tax-favored treatment claimed by corporate
taxpayers where it is unwarranted.240
The uncertainty obstacle that the Proposal presents is
thus justifiable. The tax-favored treatment of a qualifying
merger (or reorganization under current law) is an
extraordinary exception from the general realization rule. If
uncertainty results in stricter compliance with a set of rules
that distinguish an ordinary sale from a special merger, it
should be viewed as an integral element of the Proposal.

239

The IRS often seeks to recharacterize treatment of a transaction on
the basis of “substance-over-form” principles by arguing that a court
should look to the substance of the transaction and disregard the
taxpayer’s chosen form.
See Peter C. Canellos, Tax Practitioner’s
Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring
Business Transactions in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 47 (2001); Lewis R.
Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directionality in Subchapter C, 52 TAX
LAW. 457 (1999) (commenting that the fundamental question of corporate
tax practice is “when will the transactional form selected by the parties
control the tax consequences to them?”).
240
An express taxpayer election may inhibit the government’s ability
to apply a substance-over-form analysis in recharacterizing transactions.
For example, under current law, when an Acquiror purchases the stock of
a Target and makes a “Section 338(h)(10) Election” (which enables the
Acquiror to achieve a step-up in basis in the Target’s assets), the IRS
generally will not apply step transaction principles to integrate a
subsequent merger or liquidation of Target with the stock purchase. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1T (as amended in 2003).
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E. Interaction with Other Reorganization Provisions
The Proposal is intended to replace the types of
reorganizations over which the continuity of interest doctrine
currently governs—statutory mergers of a Target into an
Acquiror or its subsidiary. The Proposal is necessarily
limited in this regard because its aim is to serve as an
alternative for the flawed doctrine that determines the tax
treatment of these types of combinations.
However, there are a number of other types of
transactions that currently may be classified as
reorganizations under different provisions of the Code.241
These types of reorganizations, such as stock-for-stock242 or
assets-for-stock243 exchanges, are subject to their own sets of
statutory requirements that explicitly state the type and
composition of consideration that an Acquiror must pay to a
Target to qualify for reorganization treatment.244 Those
types of transactions are not subject to the judicially created
continuity of interest doctrine that is the focus of this Article.
An interesting question for the future is whether the
Proposal could or should be applied to all transactions that
may qualify as reorganizations under the Code, rather than
just those that are subject to the continuity of interest

241

See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (a)(2)(E) (2005).
An exchange of the Acquiror’s voting stock for Target stock (also
referred to as a “Type B” reorganization) will qualify as a reorganization if
the Target stock is exchanged solely for the Acquiror voting stock and after
the exchange the Acquiror (or a corporate subsidiary of the Acquiror) owns
at least 80 percent of the Target’s voting stock and 80 percent of each class
of the Target’s non-voting stock. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2005).
243
The acquisition of “substantially all” of the properties of the Target
in exchange “solely for voting stock” of Acquiror (also referred to as a
“Type C” reorganization) followed by the liquidation of the Target will
qualify as a reorganization. In determining whether the exchange is
“solely for voting stock,” the statute provides that the assumption by the
Acquiror of the Target’s liabilities is disregarded. An exception to the
“solely for voting stock” requirement is that the Acquiror may transfer
boot to the Target if at least 80 percent of the fair market value of Target’s
properties are acquired solely for voting stock. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2005).
244
See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C) (2005).
242
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doctrine.
Has Congress created specific consideration
requirements for these other types of reorganizations for a
reason? If one is inclined to view the tax treatment of all
corporate combinations (regardless of transaction structure)
as raising the same basic policy concerns, then perhaps the
Proposal could be viewed as a prototype that could be
expanded
beyond
forward
statutory
mergers.245
Alternatively, if one finds unique policies justifying disparate
tax treatment for different types of corporate combinations
(or otherwise desires partial renovation of the reorganization
provisions of the Code rather than wholesale demolition), the
Proposal could be enacted as presented in this Article and
limited to transactions subject to the continuity of interest
doctrine.

VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a new justification for repeal of
the continuity of interest doctrine. The typical criticisms
that commentators have offered in the past—that the
doctrine is unclear, inefficient, and unfair—are largely
irrelevant and unpersuasive.
Rather, this Article has
examined the role of the doctrine in determining whether a
particular merger merits special tax treatment. This Article
has argued that the continuity of interest doctrine is an
ineffective means of distinguishing between mergers that
represent mere changes in form and those that are the
equivalent of ordinary sales. It has demonstrated that the
end that the continuity of interest doctrine serves—an
aggregate group of Target shareholders continuing their

245

If the Proposal is expanded to cover stock or asset acquisitions (as
opposed to solely mergers), the Proposal would presumably need to include
additional rules governing the amount of a Target’s assets or stock that an
Acquiror or its shareholders must obtain in order for a mere change in
form to be deemed to have occurred. In a forward merger, that inquiry is
relatively simple because substantially all of the assets held by a Target
(at least immediately prior to the merger) are transferred to the Acquiror.
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proprietary interests as shareholders of the Acquiror—is
fiction.246
Further, this Article has offered an alternative to the
continuity of interest doctrine that differs significantly from
current law and from proposals that have been offered in the
past.
By conditioning tax-deferred treatment on the
Acquiror’s continuation of the Target’s historic business for
two years following a merger, the Proposal creates a set of
rules that more effectively identifies a merger that is akin to
a mere change in form. Likewise, the shareholder nonrecognition requirements of the Proposal distinguish purely
paper transactions from ordinary stock-for-stock exchanges.
Like many traditions, the continuity of interest doctrine
has been passed down from generation to generation without
being subjected to serious reconsideration. Unless this
reconsideration occurs in the near future, the Treasury and
IRS will likely continue to issue administrative relief that
exacerbates the fiction of continuity of interest in an attempt
to make the requirement more practical.
A doctrine
supported by such a foundation is as shaky as that famous
fiddler.247 Rather than await its demise, it is time to end this
tradition.

246
Stated differently, this Article has proclaimed that the continuity
of interest emperor is not wearing any clothes.
247
See BOCK, supra note 1.

